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This dissertation consists of three essays.
In the first essay, we study the influence of CEO experience and education on firm per-
formance, on variability of firm performance, on investment and financing policies, and on
organizational strategy. We also include measures of CEO power to study differences in in-
fluence between powerful and non-powerful CEOs. Our results suggest that older and more
experienced CEOs are associated with more conservative strategies. The younger and less
experienced the CEO, the more volatile the firm performance. MBA degree holders seem to
be more stability-oriented. We associate CEOs with technical education with more volatility
of firm performance. Firms with powerful CEOs also have more volatile performance (stock
returns). The status of a founder seems to be the most influential dimension of CEO power.
By borrowing from personality and social psychology as well as from generational theory, we
employ the 2SLS estimator in an attempt to shed more light on the direction of causality
from CEO characteristics to firm policies. We find that it is not only firms selecting CEOs
to match the company’s needs but, provided there is a sufficient period for a CEO to leave
an imprint, the causality runs from CEOs to firm outcomes as well. Firm outcomes and
policies, especially firm performance, variability of firm performance and investment policy,
reflect the CEOs’ industry and CEO experience.
In the second essay, we study and assess the role of company, industry and CEO experi-
ence in determining CEO pay. CEO compensation is viewed as the return to post-schooling
investment in human capital. We find that the effect of our three work experience measures
on various measures of CEO compensation is rather modest, so is the contribution of these
experience measures quantified as a percentage of R2. The effects of a one-standard-deviation
increase in company, industry and CEO experience on cash-based compensation do not ex-
ceed 8%. CEO experience matters more than the other measures for total compensation:
we observe as much as 25% higher total compensation for a one-standard-deviation increase
in CEO experience. None of the three experience measures seems to factor significantly in
awarding stock grants as a component of total compensation. As long as the results do not
v
reflect pay for omitted CEO characteristics correlated with our measures of CEO power,
we also find that powerful CEOs (chairman CEOs, founders) have room for rent extraction
through compensation. The contribution to the models’ R2 of any experience measure as a
single factor does not exceed 1%. Even though other (unobservable) personal characteristics
of CEOs may come ahead as more significant factors of CEO pay, we establish awareness of
the role of work experience as a determinant of CEO compensation.
The third essay complements the literature on CEO compensation by studying the effects
of job market conditions at the start of future CEOs’ careers. We also contribute to research
on cohort effects in compensation by taking a closer look at the niche job market for execu-
tives. Evidence from other labor market research points to procyclical cohort effects, positing
that favorable initial conditions positively affect careers in the long run. We find, however,
no evidence of persistent rewards for CEOs for starting their career in more successful firms,
or for the luck of entering the job market in a good economy. In a setting with future public-
firm CEOs and taking account of macroeconomic conditions at the start of their careers, our
findings rather suggest that long-term effects are countercyclical: those individuals who start
their careers in a recession, earn a higher CEO pay. We also find that initial job conditions
may yield a higher first CEO compensation but the positive effect dissipates over time. The
findings support the notion that the market for CEOs is efficient.
Keywords: (observable) CEO characteristics, CEO experience, CEO compensation, labor
market for CEOs, cohort effects
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Chapter 1
The Influence of CEO Experience and
Education on Firm Policies
1.1 Introduction
Do (observable) CEO characteristics influence firm outcomes? If so, are some characteristics
more relevant than others? Do some characteristics matter for certain firm policies more
than for other firm policies? Does CEO power, i.e. the CEO’s ability to put through his/her
decisions, reinforce the influence of the characteristics themselves? In this paper, we present
evidence on the influence of CEO experience and education on firm policies. Our empirical
study explores in an extensive manner the influence of observable managerial characteristics
(CEO experience and education) on firm outcomes in a number of categories: firm perfor-
mance, variability of firm performance, investment and financing policies, and organizational
strategy.
We test hypotheses along the lines of those presented in Hambrick and Mason (1984),
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Adams et al. (2005). We hypothesize that younger CEOs
take more risks. Firms with younger CEO have higher growth, higher variability of perfor-
mance and higher financial leverage. There is more product innovation in these firms. More
experienced CEOs opt for more conservative strategies. More conservative strategies imply
less risk taking which reflects in less growth strategies, lower variability of firm performance,
more automation. While Bertrand and Schoar (2003) hypothesize that MBA degree hold-
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ers seem to follow more aggressive strategies, Hambrick and Mason (1984) associate CEOs
holding MBA degrees with ”moderation” - less risky strategies, less innovation, focus on
short-term goals. CEOs with technical education support innovation and these firms tend
to have higher administrative complexity. Firms with CEOs with economic education tend
to have less administrative complexity. For powerful CEOs, we expect these effects to be
more significant. An overview of the expected signs of the relationships between firm policy
measures and selected CEO characteristics is in Table 1.A2 in Appendix 1.2.
In the organizational and managerial science literature, the most studied managerial char-
acteristics are demographic characteristics, and observable characteristics in general. There
are theories which advocate both the “managers matter” view and “managers do not mat-
ter” view. The former category is represented by the upper echelon theory of Hambrick and
Mason (1984). They argue that the characteristics of strategic decision makers in a company
serve as partial predictors of organizational outcomes. The emphasis is on observable man-
agerial characteristics since they are more easily accessible and less noisy than psychological
measures and can be used as proxies for unobservable personality traits. The paper contains
a number of testable propositions for each ”upper echelon” characteristic considered. The
opponents of the ”managers matter” view in the managerial science literature argue that
there is a number of organizational and environmental factors that make it difficult for one
executive, or a team of strategic decision makers, to influence firm outcomes (e.g., Lieberson
and O’Connor, 1972).
Although the managerial science literature provides valuable insight into the influence of
managers on corporate policies, the level of generality is often lower than what would be
sufficient for a well-established empirical finance study (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). Our
paper studies the influence of selected CEO characteristics on a number of measures for firm
policies and firm performance. In the corporate finance literature, we find similar tests of the
influence of observable managerial characteristics on firm outcomes but often as complements
to the main research question, as in, e.g., Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Malmendier and Tate
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(2005), and Malmendier and Tate (2008). But there might be a need for further, more
systematic examination.
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) is one of the first empirical studies that takes a “managers
matter” (instead of firm, industry or market factors) view to explain large differences in
corporate practices across firms. They study managerial fixed effects on a manager-firm
matched panel data set which allows them to follow managers (CEOs, CFOs and others)
across firms over time. Their results show that individual differences between managers
matter for company outcomes but they are not specific about which characteristics or which
“managerial styles” matter in which situation. From observable managerial characteristics,
they examine year of birth and MBA degree. They find that older managers tend to be more
conservative and MBA degree holders more aggressive.
Using data on hiring top managers in buyout and venture capital firms, Kaplan et al.
(2007) conclude that interpersonal (“soft”) skills are overvalued in hiring, and executive
(“hard”) skills matter more for company success (particularly in buyout firms). When con-
trolling for observable abilities, there is no difference in the probability of success between
firm incumbents and outside candidates, in contrast to the fact that outside CEO candidates
are usually expected to be of higher ability. We find that “hard” skills indeed matter. A
more experienced CEO is expected to have more and better executive skills, and we find that
experience-related characteristics influence a wide range of firm policies.
Although Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Malmendier and Tate (2008) primarily focus
on managerial overconfidence - a non-observable managerial characteristic - they also perform
tests with observable characteristics. Malmendier and Tate (2005) consider educational and
employment background, birth cohort, and accumulation of titles within the company. They
conclude that observable characteristics that reflect the CEO’s background may be important
for determining investment policy. In Malmendier and Tate (2008), financial education and
tenure seem to have the strongest positive influence on acquisitiveness. For accumulation
of titles (president and chairman of the board) by the CEO, they do not obtain significant
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results.
Adams and Mueller (2002) show that companies with higher R&D expenses have younger
CEOs, CEOs who have greater wealth invested in firm stock, CEOs who have strong career
experience in marketing and/or engineering, and CEOs with advanced science-related de-
grees. Nelson (2005) finds no influence of CEO characteristics (considered are age, tenure in
total, tenure with the firm, CEO compensation) on initiating changes in corporate governance
practices.
Adams et al. (2005) argue that examining managerial characteristics and the structure of
decision-making within firms is an important step towards understanding firm-level volatility.
They highlight the importance of managerial power for a manager to “matter”. As powerful
CEOs have the “ability to overcome resistance” in a consistent manner (p.1405), they manage
to persuade top management teams and/or the board to take a particular course of action.
Powerful CEOs may take good or bad decisions which will not be modified in the company
decision-making process. Adams et al. (2005) show that firms with powerful CEOs display
more variability of performance. They also find that the three measures of CEO power they
use (dummies for “founder”, “only insider on the board”, and “concentration of titles”) are
positively related with the variability of stock returns in industries with high managerial
discretion. Findings of Cheng (2008) are in line with those of Adams et al. (2005). The
larger the board, the more difficult it is to reach consensus. Firms with larger boards tend
to have less variability in performance since their boards will take less extreme decisions.
In this paper, we provide evidence on the influence of six observable CEO characteristics
(related to CEO experience and education) on fourteen firm policies divided into five groups.
We perform more systematic and more comprehensive tests also in combination with CEO
power and discretion. For data on CEOs and boards, we use the BoardEx database. The
results from the regression analysis confirm the hypotheses. Older and more experienced
CEOs are associated with more conservative strategies and might be less growth oriented.
The younger and less experienced the CEO, the more volatile the firm performance. We also
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find evidence for more investment associated with younger CEOs. MBA degree holders seem
more growth oriented but linked to less volatile firm performance as well. Also, CEOs with
economic education are associated with less firm performance volatility; the opposite holds for
CEOs with technical education.1 We also find that industry experience and SG&A expenses
are negatively associated. Additional results show that power and discretion variables may
contribute to the influence of certain characteristics. The strongest results come from the
regressions where we pair the power measures with industry or CEO experience, thus pointing
out industry and CEO experience as the more interesting observable CEO characteristics
from among the six managerial variables we study in the paper. The most statistically and
economically significant results are obtained when including the power measure Founder.
Robustness checks include replacing the industry dummies with firm dummies, and more
importantly, an attempt to examine the direction of firm-CEO causality (from firm to CEO or
from CEO to firm) by employing the pooled two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator where
we use the CEOs’ generational membership as instruments. Conditional on the validity
and relevance of our instruments, the 2SLS estimates confirm our hypothesis that CEOs’
industry and CEO experience have considerable influence on firm performance as well as on
its variability, on investment and dividend policy, and on SG&A expenses.
When justifying the CEOs’ generational membership as instruments in our 2SLS estima-
tion, we draw from personality psychology and generational theory. Some personality and
social psychology theorists suggest that generational membership plays a role in forming one’s
personality.2 The main historical events we are exposed to while growing up and reaching
young adulthood may be as important in shaping our personality as the family environment
(e.g., Twenge, 2000). Papenhausen (2006) notes that generational membership is a group -
rather than an individual - concept and it can be seen as a managerial characteristic that is
1After controlling for industry unobserved effects, the association between CEOs with technical education
and higher R&D expenses disappears.
2What we mean by generation here is not the family cohort in terms of descendant lines, but birth cohort,
i.e. people born into the same historical period, growing up in the same sociocultural environment, thus
forming a generational “peer personality” (Howe and Strauss, 1991).
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somewhere between observable and unobservable (psychological) characteristics.
We use generational membership as a ”proxy for the larger sociocultural environment”
(Twenge, 2000). We hypothesize that membership in a generation is one of the factors to
influence a CEO’s personality; personality influences experience through choices that CEOs’
make along their career paths, and experience is reflected in the firm outcomes through
CEOs’ strategic decision-making processes. Examining a possible mechanism behind expe-
rience influencing firm outcomes, we exclude the generation dummies from the second-stage
equation. We assert that large socioeconomic changes from more than a decade ago do not
have direct influence on current firm policies and performance.3
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 1.2, we present the data and the variables.
Our methodology is explained in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 discusses our findings from the
associational analysis, followed by the robustness tests in Section 1.5, including the results
from the pooled 2SLS estimation. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data description and variable definitions
1.2.1 The sample
Our panel data set contains observations on 1,930 different firms and 2,426 different CEOs.
The sample period is January 1996 - December 2006. Table 1.1 provides the number of
firm/CEO observations per year. Financial firms (two-digit SIC codes 60-69) are excluded
from the sample. Both firms and CEOs are assigned a unique identification number that
avoids duplicates (or omissions) when there are differences in how CEO or company names
are written, or when changes of company names occur.
CEOs, firms and years are indexed as m, i, and t, respectively. We assign CEO m to
a firm i in year t if the CEO works for that company at least six months in year t. We
3Howe and Strauss (1991) determine the length of one life phase as approximately 22 years and this is
roughly the duration of forming a generational “peer personality”. Our average CEO is 55 years old, which
gives us the average time period that elapsed between the “last peer personality formation” and the beginning
of our sample equal to approximately 55− 22 = 33 years.
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assert that outcomes of strategic decisions show with a time lag and these lags may as well
differ throughout companies and industries. Thus we choose to include only firm-manager
observations where the CEO is present in the firm for at least three years, time enough for
the CEO to leave an ”imprint” (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003).4 Cases where there is more
than one CEO per firm in a given year (i.e. cases of co-CEOs, joint-CEOs, group CEOs) are
not included in the sample.
1.2.2 Dependent variables and firm-level controls
Data on company characteristics, on measures for firm policies and on firm-level controls come
from Compustat North America Industrial Annual and CRSP Monthly Stocks (obtained
through WRDS).
We use fourteen different measures for firm policies, divided into five groups. Measures
of firm performance include return on assets, Tobin’s Q, and stock returns.5 Measures of the
variability of firm performance are computed as standard deviations of the firm performance
variables over 5-year rolling windows.6 Investment policy is measured by the variable Invest-
ment (capital expenditures over fixed assets) and financing policy by the variables Leverage,
Cash holdings, Interest coverage, and Dividends over earnings. We use three measures for
organizational strategy: Advertising, Research & development (R&D), and Selling, general
& administrative expenses (SG&A - overhead expenses).
All firm policy variables, with the exception of stock returns, are computed as a percentage
of total assets, sales, earnings or other measures. To mitigate the impact of outliers, all
variables that take a ratio form and all variables computed as standard deviations (of ratio-
form variables) are winsorized at the bottom and the top first percentile. Stock returns
(including dividends) are calculated as holding period returns. We include only those years
4Although we do not demand the CEO to be present for three consecutive years.
5When running the regressions with variables operating return on assets, or free cash flow over total assets,
in place of the variable return on assets, the results are both quantitatively and qualitatively similar, so we
do not include these results in the tables.
6Results for standard deviations of operating return on assets and free cash flow over total assets are,
again, similar to those for return on assets, and they are not tabulated.
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where all 12 monthly returns are available. Table 1.A1 in Appendix 1.1 contains detailed
information on how the firm policy measures are constructed.
Which firm-level controls are included in the regression depends on the firm policy mea-
sure. The only firm-level control present in all regressions is the indicator variable Complex
firm. The Complex firm dummy equals one if the number of the firm’s business segments
is higher than one, and equals zero otherwise. For measures of firm performance and of
variability of firm performance, we include natural logarithm of total assets (firm size) as
control. For investment, we include lagged (t-1 ) Tobin’s Q, lagged (t-1 ) logarithm of total
assets, and cash flow. For measures of financing policies, return on assets, cash flow, and
lagged (t-1 ) natural logarithm of total assets are included as controls. Controls for measures
of organizational strategy are: return on assets, cash flow, and natural logarithm of total
assets.
1.2.3 Main independent variables, measures of managerial power
and discretion
The main independent variables are represented by six observable CEO characteristics: three
experience-related variables and three education-related variables. Data on CEO character-
istics are drawn from the BoardEx database.
The experience-related variables capture different aspects of acquiring knowledge, skills
and practice during a CEO’s life. The most general variable from the experience-related
variables is Age. The other two variables are more specific from the professional experience
point of view. Industry experience refers to the total number of years up to time t that the
CEO spent in companies of the particular industry that the current firm belongs to at time t.
We hypothesize that knowledge of the industry may facilitate the choice of strategies at the
top executive level. Industries are identified using the Fama-French 49 industry classification.
We use the Fama-French industry classification rather than identifying industries according
their two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code because it provides us with a
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more sensible, more organic grouping of industries. CEO experience is the total number of
years in various chief executive officer positions held by the company’s CEO in various firms,
not necessarily in the same industry, throughout his/her career up to time t. It proxies for
the CEO’s knowledge on the code of conduct of different companies which may improve the
strategic decision making when the individual is in charge of managing the entire company.
The education-related variables are all indicator variables. MBA is a dummy variable
that equals one if the CEO holds an MBA degree. Economic education is a dummy variable
that equals one if the CEO graduated from economics, finance or related courses. Here we
consider undergraduate or graduate courses with “Economics”, “Management”, “Marketing”,
“Accounting”, “Finance”, “Banking”, “Business” and related, in the course name. Economic
education does not include MBA degrees. Technical education is a dummy variable that
equals one if the CEO graduated from engineering courses (in areas such as computer science,
chemistry, physics, various technology areas). Again, both undergraduate and graduate
courses are considered. The same CEO may have both economic and technical education.
We use three different measures of CEO power, and an alternative to managerial power
- managerial discretion. These variables represent different aspects of the manager’s ability
to promote his ideas and put them into practice, thus overcoming “resistance” from the
environment (e.g., the board, other top managers)(Adams et al., 2005). The power and
discretion measures are the same as in Adams et al. (2005). Accumulation of titles is a
dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Founder is a
dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the (co-)founder of the firm. Only insider
is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is the only insider on the board, i.e. if
the remainder of the board is constituted by independent directors. The construction of the
latter variable is slightly different from that in Adams et al. (2005). While they look at the
executive compensation tables of firms to identify whether a CEO is the only member of the
board receiving executive compensation for the given year, we inspect entire boards for firm
i in year t in BoardEx, and identify the CEO as the only insider on the board if all the other
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members of the board are indicated as independent directors.
The power variables are chosen to cover different sources of managerial power. A manager
powerful in terms of accumulation of titles has his/her CEO position reinforced by being the
chairman of the board. Then he/she may exert more influence upon strategic decisions
than a “regular” CEO. A founder may have more say (or even the last word) in strategic
decisions about the firm than any other member of the board or any other member of the
firm’s management. If the manager is the only insider on the board of directors, he/she
may have superior information about the firm and may use this information to affect board
decisions according to his/her strategic goals. We consider managers powerful also if their
firm’s industry is a high-discretion industry, as in Adams et al. (2005).7 Managerial discretion
(i.e. high-discretion industry) is a dummy variable and indicates an industry (two-digit SIC
code) in which there are less external constraints on managerial decision-making (high level
of discretion for managers) according to experts’ opinion.
Table 1.2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables. The total number of firm-year
observations varies between 4,389 observations (on advertising) and 14,751 observations (on
stock returns, standard deviation of stock returns, complex firm dummy, accumulation of
titles, only insider, and generation). Firm variables in all firm policy categories exhibit large
variability (when looking at means, medians, standard deviations, minima and maxima).
CEOs’ age varies between 26 and 90 years. The average CEO is 54.5 years old, has 9.79
years of experience in the industry of his/her current employer, and 10.41 years of experience
as CEO. The median values indicate that more than fifty percent of the CEOs in the sample
do not have neither economic, or MBA, nor technical education. More than half the CEOs
in the sample are powerful CEOs in terms of accumulation of titles, and work for a company
in a high-discretion industry.
7Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) obtain ratings on 70 (four -digit SIC) industries’ discretion based on
subjective assessments by a panel of academic experts. Adams et al. (2005) average these ratings for two-
digit SIC industries. Industries in the top 40% of the rating distribution are categorized as high-discretion
industries (for the respective industries, the discretion dummy equals one) and industries in the bottom 40%
of the distribution as low-discretion industries (for the respective industries, the discretion dummy equals
zero).
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Table 1.3 contains the correlation coefficients of the explanatory variables. Most of the
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. As expected, the experience-related
measures are all moderately positively correlated, with correlation coefficients around 0.3-0.4.
MBA degree is negatively correlated with experience; it is an indication that MBA degree
holders in this sample tend to be younger. MBA degree and economic education are positively
correlated (0.31). The correlation coefficient between MBA and technical education is close
to zero. Economic education and technical education are negatively correlated (-0.12). The
correlation coefficients for any pair of power measures are very low, an indication that power
variables may indeed be capturing different aspects of managerial power. Complex firms tend
to have larger total assets and smaller (lagged) Tobin’s Qs, as indicated by the correlation
coefficients 0.28 and -0.17, respectively. No pair of explanatory variables that appear in
the same regression is highly correlated. In fact, the majority of correlation coefficients of
variable pairs that appear in the same regression do not exceed 0.2 in absolute value.
1.3 Methodology
First, as a basis for comparison, we run least squares dummy variable regressions of firm
policy measures on each main independent variable, firm-level controls, and year and indus-
try dummies. The industry dummies use the Fama-French 49 industry classification. The
baseline linear unobserved effects model is:






iδ2 + εit (1.1)
where firms are indexed as i, managers as m, and time periods (years) as t. Yit represents
the dependent variables, X(i)m(t) represents the main independent variables. Zit(−1) is a vector
of firm-level controls. τt stands for year dummies and ιi for industry dummies. α and εit
represent the intercept and the error term, respectively. Indices in brackets mean that the
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indexing is not applicable for all combinations of dependent and independent variables. In
all regressions (the baseline model as well as all models henceforward), standard errors are
corrected for clustering of observations at the firm level.
Then, we successively add the power measures as well as their interaction terms with the
main independent variables in each of the regressions:








where Pwr(i)m(t) represents power measures.
Year and industry dummies, which control for average differences throughout years and
industries, are included in order to separate these differences between entities (firms) from
other influences. By including industry dummies, we isolate the unobserved industry effects
that do not vary over time (e.g., long-term industry standards). Similarly, by including year
dummies, we isolate the effects of factors that change over time but not over firms (e.g.,
macroeconomic developments, industry-specific shocks, changes in legislation).
Since industry dummies and the discretion dummy are collinear, industry dummies are
excluded from the regressions containing the managerial discretion dummy (Discr(i)m(t)):




tδ1 + εit (1.3)
As a robustness test, we rerun the basic regressions (Eq. 1.1), and the regressions on
industry experience (IndExpimt), power variables and interaction terms, but with firm fixed
effects as the alternative to industry dummies. Recall that we impose the condition that
only firms with at least three years of data are considered. The conclusions from previous
regression results should withstand this change since our aim with fixed effects regressions is
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to control for all potential firm or industry factors in order to best isolate the effects of CEO
characteristics on firm policies. Unlike industry dummies, firm fixed effects ϕi are included
in the regressions containing the managerial discretion dummy:




tδ1 + ϕi + εit
(1.4)
1.4 Main results
This section comprises the results from our associational analysis. We deal with robustness
and causality issues in Section 1.5.
1.4.1 Results from the baseline regressions
Table 1.4 contains results from regressions of the form presented in Eq. (1.1). The internal
validity of these results does not allow us to take conclusions about the direction of causality,
thus we do not take conclusions about to what extent is CEO influence endogenous. Associ-
ational analysis, however, is useful in indicating which CEO characteristics and which firm
outcomes exhibit stronger association.
The majority of the strongly statistically significant (at the 1% level) coefficients in Ta-
ble 1.4 come from the regressions on the experience-related CEO characteristics (age, industry
experience and CEO experience). All regressions of the standard deviation of stock returns
on CEO characteristics have significant coefficients on the main independent variable. The
coefficients can be interpreted as percentage changes since the dependent variables can be
either already directly expressed as percentages (the variable stock returns and the standard
deviation variables), or they take a ratio form (see Table 1.A1 in Appendix 1.1). In all the
analysis of results that follows, as we interpret the regression coefficients, we always maintain
the assumption that the other control variables are held constant.
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The signs of the experience-related variables’ coefficients are as expected: firms with
older and more experienced (both industry experience and CEO experience) CEOs have, on
average, higher returns on assets, lower Tobin’s Q and lower stock returns. This may reflect
older, more experienced CEOs opting for less growth-oriented, more conservative strategies.
Older CEOs may choose less risky, thus on average less profitable strategies.
A one-standard-deviation change in experience-related variables yields a change in per-
formance variables return on assets and stock returns of approximately 1.2 to 1.62%. For
Tobin’s Q, a one-standard-deviation increase in age decreases this measure of firm perfor-
mance by 10.29%. A one-standard-deviation increase in industry experience and CEO ex-
perience decreases Tobin’s Q by 8.75% and 7.21%, respectively. Firms with older and more
experienced CEOs have also smaller stock returns. With respect to a one-standard-deviation
increase in age, industry experience and CEO experience, the decrease in stock returns is
2.9%, 1.36% and 1.08%, respectively.
Firms with older and more experienced CEOs have, on average, lower variability of firm
performance, as measured by the standard deviations of the firm performance variables. An
increase in age and experience by one standard deviation is associated with a decrease in
the standard deviation of return of assets between 1.36 and 1.53%. The associated decrease
in the volatility of stock returns is 0.5% for more CEO experience, 1.04% for more industry
experience, and 1.4% for higher age. In case of volatility measured by the standard deviation
of Tobin’s Q, a one-standard-deviation increase in age (8.50 years), in industry experience
(8.02 years), and in CEO experience (8.29 years), decreases the volatility by 14.46%, 13.25%
and 7.71%, respectively.
Results in Table 1.4 also show that firms with older and more experienced CEOs tend
to invest less. A one-standard-deviation increase in experience-related variables decreases
investment on average very moderately, by 0.66 to 1.45%. As for financing policies, we ob-
tain statistically significant (at the 1%) results for the firm policy measures cash holdings
and dividends over earnings. Firms with older CEOs and CEOs with more experience in the
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industry hold less cash and pay out more dividends. The marginal effect of industry experi-
ence estimated at its one-standard-deviation increase is -22.8% for cash holdings and +1.44%
for dividend over earnings. The latter may stem from higher dividend payout and/or lower
earnings but both are consistent with older CEOs following more conservative strategies.
Firms with older CEOs seem to have lower advertising expenses and lower SG&A expenses
on average. Similarly, we obtain a negative, economically less significant association between
a CEO’s industry experience and overhead expenses as well as between a CEO’s previous
experience as CEO and R&D expenses.
Education-related managerial characteristics yield considerably less significant results
than experience-related characteristics. Firms with CEOs with technical education have
by 4.69% higher stock returns and by 0.84% higher variability of stock returns than firms
whose CEOs do not have technical education, results significant at the 5% and 1% level,
respectively. Technical education is also negatively associated with leverage: 2.05% lower
debt ratio for firms whose CEOs have technical education compared to those whose CEOs
do not have technical education. Compared to firms whose CEOs do not have MBA degrees
or economic education, firms with CEOs with MBA degrees and with CEOs with economic
education, have, on average, by approximately 0.5% lower volatility of stock returns, a result
significant at the 5% level of significance. CEOs with MBA degrees seem to be employed by
firms with higher Tobin’s Qs. This difference of 18.15% between firm with MBA-CEOs and
CEOs without MBA is statistically significant at the 5% level.
The results above suggest that CEOs with economic education or an MBA degree may
have more expertise to make decisions which lower stock return volatility. These CEOs
may take more informed strategic decisions that result in “smoother” outcomes. It supports
the hypothesis of Hambrick and Mason (1984) that MBA degree holders opt for less risky
strategies, contrary to the supposition of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) that MBA degree
holders are more aggressive. We will explore the causality from CEOs to firm volatility
further in Section 1.5.
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1.4.2 The effect of power measures
Tables 1.5 to 1.10 present results from regressions where we add the managerial power mea-
sures and their interactions with the main regressors: Age, Industry experience, CEO ex-
perience, MBA, Economic education and Technical education. We test whether there is a
significant difference in firm outcomes depending on CEO power, i.e. whether there is a
difference between firms with powerful and non-powerful CEOs with the same (level of) ob-
servable CEO characteristic. Tables 1.5 to 1.10 contain results from regressions on the main
regressors and power measures as in Eq. (1.2) (the results are reported in three leftmost
sections of each table) and Eq. (1.3) (the results are reported in the fourth, rightmost section
of each table). The regressions with managerial discretion do not include industry dummies,
since industry dummies are collinear with the managerial discretion dummy.
The pattern of sign, magnitude and significance of coefficients on the variable Age is
similar to the one in Table 1.4. There are, however, few results with significant coefficients
on power or interaction with power. Including Accumulation of titles, Only insider, and
Managerial discretion in regressions that use Age as a measure of experience does not produce
any strongly statistically significant results. One of the reasons behind power measures
remaining insignificant may be the inclusion of the interaction variables in the regression.
Power and interaction with power are, naturally, highly correlated which results in standard
errors of power being inflated and yielding statistically insignificant (though in a number of
cases economically significant) coefficients on power. We can think of this from the point
of view of significance of a result when age equals zero. There is no observation where age
equals zero (it is not a very reasonable assumption) so the power coefficients for managers
with age zero are also not expected to be significant.
For measures of firm performance and of the variability of firm performance, all coefficients
on the variable Age are statistically significant at the 1% or the 5% level. Strongly statistically
significant coefficients in regressions on power and the respective interaction terms appear
in the regression of standard deviation of stock returns, and of investment on, among other
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variables, Founder and the interaction term of Founder and Age. Consistent with Adams
et al. (2005), firms with founder CEOs have a higher variability of stock returns than firms
with non-powerful CEOs. The standard deviation of stock returns for firms with a founder
CEO is, on average, 6.94% higher than for firms with a non-powerful CEO of the same age.
The difference slightly decreases the older the CEOs are. With a one-standard-deviation
(8.50 years) increase in age, the standard deviation of stock returns for powerful (founder)
CEOs is, on average, 5.32% higher than for non-powerful CEOs, holding the other variables
constant. If the CEO is the founder of the company, there is 21.74% more investment in
these firms compared to firms with non-founders of the same age. Again, with younger
CEOs this difference between founders and non-founders slightly decreases. If age increases
by one standard deviation, investment in firms with founder CEOs is 17.91% higher than for
firms with non-founder CEOs. In companies where the CEO is the founder of the company,
dividends over earnings are, on average, 8.07% lower than in companies with non-founder
CEOs. At older ages, the difference between powerful and non-powerful CEOs decreases. For
an increase of one standard deviation in age, dividends over earnings of firms with founder
CEOs are 6.88% lower than for firms with non-powerful CEOs. For all other cases in Table 1.5,
we fail to reject the hypothesis that powerful and non-powerful CEOs have the same effect
on firm policies. We have to keep in mind that coefficients on power may be inflated due to
their correlation with the interaction variable. This is important for conclusions about the
economic significance of the results.
Another experience-related variable is Industry experience. Table 1.6 contains significant
results for nearly all measures of firm policies. Overall, the pattern of sign, magnitude and
significance of coefficients on industry experience follows that of Table 1.4. Also, there are
considerably more significant coefficients on power measures than in Table 1.5. Power seems
to matter for firm performance, variability of firm performance, investment but also for some
financing and organizational policies. Firms with powerful CEOs (chairman CEOs and only
insiders) have higher returns on assets than firms with non-powerful CEOS. Compared to
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firms where the CEO is not the founder, firms with founder CEOs of the same industry ex-
perience have 39.52% higher Tobin’s Q. Companies with powerful - in terms of accumulation
of titles - CEOs have 1.99% lower standard deviation of return on assets than firms with
non-powerful CEOs. The difference decreases when the CEO is more experienced. With a
one-standard-deviation increase in industry experience (8.03 years), the difference between
firms with chairman CEOs (accumulation of titles) and non-powerful CEOs is, on average,
2.95%, at the 1% level of statistical significance. We fail to reject the hypothesis that the
standard deviation of Tobin’s Q as well as the standard deviation of stock returns of firms
with founder CEOs and non-founder CEOs are equal. Standard deviations of Tobin’s Q and
of stock returns are, on average, higher for firms with founder CEOs than for firms with non-
founder CEOs. The former difference is 37.97%, the latter 3.02%, and both decrease at higher
levels of experience. The results are economically significant. A one-standard-deviation in-
crease in industry experience increases the standard deviation of Tobin’s Q of firms with
founder CEOs by 12.12% compared to firms with non-founder CEOs with the same industry
experience. Similarly, the standard deviation of stock returns increases by 1.09% for founders
compared to non-founders with the same experience. Firms with founder CEOs invest 6.21%
more than companies with non-founder CEOs with the same industry experience. Again,
the difference decreases at higher levels of experience. An increase in industry experience
by one standard deviations means, on average, an increase of 2.28% in investment in firms
with founder CEOs compared to firms with non-founder CEOs. Companies with founder
CEOs and with CEOs with more discretion hold, on average, more cash than companies
with non-powerful CEOs. In case of companies with founder CEOs, the difference of -2.86%
in dividends over earnings compared to companies with non-powerful CEOs is statistically
significant at the 1% level.
Results in Table 1.7 also follow the pattern outlined in Table 1.4. Regressions on CEO
experience yield a slightly lower number of significant results (both on experience and power
variables) than regressions on industry experience. From among the power measures, Founder
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yields again the most of the strongly statistically significant results. Firms with founder
CEOs have, on average, 4.13% lower returns to assets and by 12.01% higher stock returns
than firms with non-founder CEOs with the same CEO experience. Firms with founder
CEOs have 3.51% higher standard deviation of returns on assets, which is economically
significant and statistically significant at the 5% level. Standard deviations of Tobin’s Q and
of stock returns for companies with founder CEOs is 41.03% and 4.18%,respectively, higher
than for non-powerful CEOs. The results are statistically significant at the 1% level. A
one-standard-deviation increase in CEO experience (8.29 years) increases standard deviation
of stock returns in firms with founder CEOs by 2.77% compared to firms with non-founder
CEOs of the same experience. The difference decreases with more CEO experience. Similarly,
firms with founder CEOs have, on average, by 7.88% higher investment than firms with non-
founder CEOs with the same CEO experience. A one-standard-deviation increase in CEO
experience increases investment by 5.14% for firms with founder CEOs compared to firms with
non-founder CEOs. The difference decreases with more CEO experience. Firms in industries
with higher managerial discretion have 0.91% lower dividends over earnings compared to
firms with lower managerial discretion, but the difference decreases as the CEO experience
increases. The overall effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in CEO experience is a
decrease in the difference between firms with powerful and non-powerful CEOs of 1.16%.
Results for the experience-related variables suggest that more conservatism by more ex-
perienced CEOs may prevent higher earnings from riskier projects, but the corresponding
companies tend to have more stable performance as well.
The three education-related variables that we use are all dummy variables. All coefficients
in Tables 1.8 to 1.10 are coefficients on dummy variables, or on interactions of two dummy
variables. The results, thus, are interpreted with reference to a base group of managers that
do not have a certain type of education (MBA, economic or technical), and do not have
a powerful status in the company or are employed by a firm in a low discretion industry.
Regression results in Tables 1.8 to 1.10 show that adding power and discretion variables does
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not yield more statistically significant outcomes compared to the baseline results in Table 1.4.
In Table 1.8, where the MBA dummy is the main regressor, the standard deviation of the
return on assets is lower for CEOs with an MBA degree; 1.61% lower when we regress on
Accumulation of titles and 1.54% lower when we regress on Managerial discretion. Chairman
CEOs and CEOs with high discretion decrease the standard deviation of return on assets by
1.48% and 0.86%, respectively. All differences are in comparison with the base group of CEOs,
i.e. CEOs with no MBA degree and no power or low discretion. The respective interaction
terms are not statistically significant at conventional levels. From the power measures, the
founder dummy yields many strongly significant results. Firms with founder CEOs appear
to have more volatile performance (1.79% more volatility in stock returns), more investment
(a difference of 3.32%), higher cash holdings and lower dividends over earnings. Firms with
chairman CEOs have lower return on assets (by 1.48%) and lower R&D expenses (by 1.82%)
than firms whose CEOs do not hold both titles.
In Table 1.9, economic education produces very few significant results in any of the regres-
sions of firm policy measures. Many of the coefficients on Founder continue to be statistically
significant when economic education is included but we cannot reject the hypothesis of the
respective coefficients on economic education being equal to zero. This holds for standard
deviation of Tobin’s Q, standard deviation of stock returns, investment, cash holdings and
dividends over earnings. The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the founder dummy
when economic education is the main regressor follow closely the results from Table 1.8.
Firms with founder CEOs have higher volatility of Tobin’s Q (a difference of 29.92%), higher
volatility of stock returns (a difference of 2.09%), more investment (a difference of 2.86%),
more cash holdings (1.71-times) and less dividends over earnings (by 2.12%) than firms with
non-founder CEOs. Firms with chairman CEOs have 2.21% lower R&D expenses than firms
with non-powerful CEOs.
Technical education is the education-related variable for which we obtain the most statis-
tically significant results, as reported in Table 1.10. The pattern for the founder dummy is as
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in Tables 1.8 and 1.9: when the technical education is the main regressor, firms with founder
CEOs have more volatile performance - 25.86% more volatile for Tobin’s Q and 2.02% for
stock returns, invest 3.35% more, hold 171% more cash, and have 2.75% lower dividends
over earnings. When the power measure is Accumulation of titles, firms with powerful CEOs
have, on average, 1.66% higher returns on assets and 1.83% lower R&D expenses than firms
whose CEOs are not in a powerful position. Firms with founder CEOs with technical edu-
cation have 2.37% lower standard deviation of stock returns than the base group firms. The
interaction variable is not statistically significant, the coefficients on technical education and
on founder are significant at the 1% level. For firms with only-insider CEOs with technical
education, the difference compared to the base group is not economically significant accord-
ing to our results. Compared to the base group firms, firms with CEOs who have technical
education and higher discretion have 0.5% lower dividends over earnings. Firms with only-
insider CEOs with technical education have 3.05% higher return on assets and lower interest
coverage (20-times the earnings over interest) than firms with non-powerful CEOs.
The results in Tables 1.8 to 1.10 indicate a very limited role that the type of CEOs’
education may play in firm outcomes. Many of the results are less economically significant
than it was the case for experience-related variables. Also, more often than in the case
of experience-related variables, we fail to reject the hypothesis that there is no difference
between firms with powerful CEOs with a certain type of education and the benchmark
group of firms.
1.5 Robustness of results and causality issues
The robustness and causality tests we perform are the following:
• running firm fixed effects regressions on the original dataset;8
8We also tried applying the mover dummy method as in Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Graham et
al. (2012). Restricting our dataset by applying certain conditions significantly decreases the number of
observations. This ”mover-CEO dataset” has only 251 observations, thus, taking into account the number
of our covariates, the statistical power of our tests becomes seriously undermined. We do not report any of
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• two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions using generation dummies as instrument for
industry and CEO experience.
In a non-experimental setting with observational data like ours it is difficult to make con-
clusions about the direction of causality. Firm fixed effects can be used to address endogeneity
bias if the unobserved factors that cause endogeneity do not change over time, or are close to
time-invariant (Graham et al., 2012). Hence, fixed effects can be used to isolate the causality
effects to some extent, however, 2SLS have higher internal validity to do so (Nichols, 2007,
p. 507). The pooled 2SLS may be the most robust procedure to apply when we have an
unbalanced panel with endogeneity and selection bias (Semykina and Wooldridge, 2010).
Tables 1.11 and 1.12 report results from regressions where we replace industry dummies
with firm fixed effects. In Table 1.11, we observe a smaller number of statistically significant
results compared to Table 1.4. If the regressors of interest do not exhibit sufficient variability
over time (which is certainly the case for the time-invariant education-related variables),
fixed effects may absorb their influence and the coefficients on the main regressors become
biased. All the most significant (at the 5% and 1% level) coefficients in Table 1.11 match
in sign the coefficients presented in Table 1.4. On the other hand, as for the magnitude of
the coefficients, we observe often more than a 50% drop in the magnitude of the coefficients
on education-related measures. In the case of the experience-related variables, we observe
an increase of more than 50% in magnitude. A one-standard-deviation increase in industry
experience (8.03 years) is associated with 0.56% and 0.32% lower volatility of return on assets
and stock returns, respectively. A one-standard-deviation increase in CEO experience (8.29
years) decreases the standard deviation of returns on assets, the standard deviation of stock
returns and investment by 0.66%, 0.33% and 0.75%, respectively. Firms have, on average,
4.12% higher leverage when the CEO has an MBA degree, invest 1.95% more when the CEO
has economic education, and have by 10.77% higher stock returns if the CEO has technical
education. The time frame of ten years in our sample may be too short to apply firm fixed
the regression results and tests performed with this too small a sample.
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effects. Therefore, the statistical power of our tests may be too low.
Table 1.12 presents the results from firm fixed effects regressions on industry experience
in combination with the power measures. We obtain a number of significant results for all of
the power measures (cf. Tables 1.12 and 1.6). The signs of the coefficient estimates generally
remain the same, the magnitudes are comparable or lower. For a one-standard-deviation
increase in industry experience, firms with chairman CEOs have, on average, 1.4% lower
volatility of returns on assets, 29.54-times lower interest coverage and 1.95% lower overhead
expenses than firms with non-powerful CEOs. For firms in industries with more managerial
discretion, the volatility of return on assets is 1.17% lower compared to the base group. The
difference in the volatility of stock returns between companies with and without powerful
CEOs is +0.61% for founder CEOs and -0.84% for only-insider CEOs. We interpret the
differences in results reported in Tables 1.12 and 1.6 as firm fixed effects absorbing some of
the (less time-varying) influence of the regressors of interest.
We run 2SLS regressions for two of the CEO characteristics that we consider more inter-
esting - the two experience measures, Industry experience and CEO experience. Using the
pooled 2SLS estimator, we estimate the following model:






iδ2 + υit (1.5)
where i, m and t denote firms, managers and years, respectively, Expimt stands for industry
or CEO experience, and υit is the error term. τt and ιi represent year and industry dummies,
respectively. In the 2SLS procedure, experience is instrumented by the generation dummies.









id2 + emt (1.6)
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where a and emt are the intercept and the error term, respectively. Genm represents our
generation dummies. We employ three generation dummies. Generation of WWs and Great
Depression equals one if the CEO was born before or in 1945. Generation of Baby Boomers
equals one if the CEO was born between 1946 and 1964. Generation X+ equals one for CEOs
born after 1964. This rather crude grouping of generations is based on a socio-historical -
as opposed to demographical - notion of generations (e.g., Pilcher, 1994; Howe and Strauss,
1991; Schuman and Scott, 1989). More than half of the CEOs in the sample come from the
“Generation of Baby Boomers”.
Employing the 2SLS estimator requires special care in the choice of excluded instruments.
The advantage of the 2SLS estimator over a biased OLS estimator is its consistency. However,
the 2SLS estimator is always less efficient than the OLS estimator, thus, if we do not have
valid instruments, OLS is preferable to 2SLS since the bias of the 2SLS estimate is too large.
Establishing the validity and relevance of excluded instruments is therefore crucial. Our
exclusion restriction for the 2SLS methodology is that generational membership does not have
direct effect on firm outcomes besides the effect through CEOs’ industry or CEO experience.
Generational membership should not be correlated with possible omitted variables (i.e. also
with the error term) in Eq. (1.5). Naturally, it is not possible to control for all relevant
variables in Eq. (1.5), hence we should be careful in interpreting our results. Our estimates are
consistent only if there are no further endogenous or omitted variables in Eq. (1.5) and (1.6).
In Panel A of Table 1.13, we report the pooled 2SLS estimates and their standard errors,
and the pooled OLS estimates and their standard errors for comparison. We also report
joint (F-stat and p-values) as well as individual (p-values) overidentification tests and tests
of main independent variables’ endogeneity (F-stat and p-values). The majority of the 2SLS
coefficients is statistically significant at the 1% level even after we control for industry unob-
served effects by including industry dummies. The signs of the coefficients remain stable and
follow the pattern in Table 1.4.9 A one-standard-deviation increase in industry experience
9In the case of advertising as the response variable, we report results where industry unobserved effects are
not explicitly controlled for, thus, the coefficients need to be interpreted with caution. The relatively small
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increases return on assets by 5.46% and decreases Tobin’s Q and stock returns by 24.89%
and 12.04%, respectively. The changes in the respective firm performance variables due to
a one-standard-deviation change in CEO experience are +3.23%, -15.09% and -6.63%. A
one-standard-deviation increase in industry (CEO) experience comes with a 4.74% (2.57%)
decrease in firm volatility for standard deviation of return on assets, a 53.79% (31.43%)
decrease for standard deviation of Tobin’s Q, and a 3.69% (2.24%) decrease for standard
deviation of stock returns. Investment decreases by 5.06% and 2.99% for a one-standard-
deviation increase in industry and CEO experience, respectively. Dividends over earnings, on
the other hand, increase by 2.73% and 1.66% for the same change in industry and CEO expe-
rience, respectively. From among the organizational policies’ proxies, it is only SG&A whose
coefficients remain strongly statistically significant in both the pooled OLS and 2SLS regres-
sions. A one-standard-deviation increase in managerial experience decreases the overhead
expenses by 4.01% and 2.24% for industry and CEO experience, respectively. The estimates
of the effect of CEOs’ industry and CEO experience on R&D spending are the only ones that
are statistically significant when estimated with pooled OLS but not statistically significant
at conventional levels when estimated with pooled 2SLS. As expected, the standard errors
associated with the coefficients from the pooled 2SLS regressions are larger than those of the
pooled OLS coefficients. Estimates from applying IV/2SLS methods are always noisier than
estimates from OLS. We find that after instrumenting the two experience-related measures
with generation dummies, CEO experience measures become significantly more influential
but standard errors increase as well. If our exclusion restriction holds, comparing the magni-
tudes of the pooled OLS and 2SLS estimates, we underestimate the influence of both industry
and CEO experience on firm policies by at least 100% (in many cases more) if we do not
account for endogeneity in industry and CEO experience.
sample for advertising regressions (around 4,000 observations as compared to more than 10,000 observations
in the other regressions) and a large number of industry dummies results into a covariance matrix that is not
of a full rank.
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Ideally, the main regressor and the instruments are strongly correlated and the instru-
ments are completely exogenous. Problems of finite-sample bias and inconsistency of estima-
tion are exacerbated to the extent these conditions are not fulfilled (Nelson and Starz, 1990).
Since 2SLS estimates can be subject to significant biases compared to a simple OLS estima-
tion, it is of great importance to perform a number of tests confirming IV relevance. Since
no IV is always better than bad IV, IV methods should be used only when valid instruments
are available. Finding valid instruments, i.e. instruments that are exogenous and relevant
(e.g., Stock and Yogo, 2005, p. 80), is a challenging task. Tests to warrant the usage of IV
methods should be reported.
To verify the validity of our instruments, we run a number of tests (reported in both panels
of Table 1.13). In the overidentification tests, we test whether the instrumental variables
are uncorrelated with the standard errors. We report both the instruments’ joint and the
instruments’ individual test results. Favorably to the validity of our instruments, we fail to
reject the null at the 1% level of statistical significance in many cases, except where Tobin’s
Q, the standard deviation of ROA, the standard deviation of Tobin’s Q and interest coverage
are the dependent variables (in the second stage).10 In the endogeneity tests, we test whether
the endogenous regressors in the model are indeed endogenous. We also report Wooldridge’s
(1995) robust F-test. We reject the null of uncorrelated main independent variables (assumed
to be endogenous) and structural errors at conventional statistical levels for leverage, interest
coverage, and R&D for both industry and CEO experience as the main regressor.
In Panel B of Table 1.13, we report the first-stage from the 2SLS regression with ROA
as the second-stage response variable. Naturally, the first-stage results are very similar for
all firm policy variables, since the first-stage regressions have the same specification for all
fourteen 2SLS regressions. What may vary is the number of observations in each regression
but the differences in estimates and test results are minimal. We report the coefficients on the
10We should bear in mind that failing to reject the null of overidentification is neither necessary nor
sufficient for instrument validity. However, rejecting the null in an overidentification test should lead us to
reconsider our excluded instruments.
26
excluded instrumental variables - generation dummies, first-stage F-test and the respective
p-values, and partial R-squared (Shea, 1997). The coefficients indicate that CEOs who
belong to the baby-boom generation have, on average, 2.98 years lower industry experience
and 5.54 years lower CEO experience than the related base group of CEOs (the CEOs who
do not belong to the particular generation). In the case of “Generation X+”, industry
experience is 4.83 years lower and CEO experience is 8.14 years lower. These results are as
expected and reasonable.11 The F-tests are a robust version of the Cragg-Donald F-statistic
(namely, the Kleinbergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic) to joint significance of the instruments
and indicates the strength of identification. All values in the table are significantly larger
than the respective Stock-Yogo (2005) weak identification critical values. Another indicator
of how good the instrumental variable is in a given setting is the partial R-squared of the first-
stage regression (according to Shea, 1997). For industry experience, the results are weaker
- approximately 3.63%; for CEO experience, the partial R-squared is 10.75%. According to
Shea (1997), the relatively low values of partial R-squared may imply a weak-instrument
problem but Hahn and Hausman (2002) show, by examining the determinants of 2SLS vs.
OLS bias, that even when the R-squared of the first-stage regression is low, it is a large
F-statistic of the first-stage regression that tells us whether our instruments are probably
strong enough so that the 2SLS versus OLS bias is low. Indeed, our F-statistic for the joint
significance of instruments in the first stage is very high (289.77 with a p-value of 0.0000).
Our instruments seem to be strong.
To go further in examining the strength of our instruments, we apply weak-instrument
robust estimation, namely, we employ the limited information maximum likelihood Fuller
estimator with the Fuller coefficient equal first to 1, then to 4, and we also compute the
11In order to verify the instruments’ rationale, we run dependent variables’ as well as the main independent
variables’ (experience measures’) reduced form regressions (not reported in the paper). If generation is a valid
instrument, we should obtain statistically significant coefficients with reasonable signs. In the experience
measures’ reduced forms all coefficients are strongly statistically significant with a negative sign which is
reasonable since younger generation would have less experience. Also, in the dependent variables’ reduced
forms the signs are as expected, the opposite of what we’ve seen in the associational analysis, and with
comparable statistical significance. Reduced form regressions are the first step in exploring whether our
choice of instrumental variables is reasonable.
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two-sided conditional likelihood ratio confidence sets as first suggested by Moreira (2003).12
The sign, magnitude and significance of estimates matches the one reported in the 2SLS
estimation. These results (not reported due to strong similarity) strengthen our confidence
in the choice of generational membership dummies as excluded instruments.
When performing IV/2SLS estimation, we try to give as much credibility as possible to our
results. We provide evidence on instrument validity and strength, but possible heterogeneity
in agents’ behavioral reactions to the instrument has been raised as an issue in a number
of papers (Murray, 2006). The problem is whether we are estimating the effects we want
to study. In our case, the question is whether instrumenting experience with generational
dummies returns estimates that correctly account for experience’s effect on firm policies, or
we are just estimating some partial effect of a component of experience which is correlated
with generational membership. Given the “black box” nature of the process from generational
membership to firm outcomes, we cannot exclude that another mechanism is at work.
1.6 Conclusion
Our findings contribute to the research on the effects of managerial characteristics on firm
outcomes. We focus on three experience-related characteristics and three education-related
characteristics. We study their influence on firm performance, on variability of firm per-
formance, on investment and financing policies and on organizational strategy. The results
are generally less significant for education variables than for the experience-related variables.
Overall, the economic significance of the results indicates that CEOs matter for firm out-
comes on a relatively small but important scale. For example, and contrary to the findings
of Bertrand and Schoar (2003), we find that MBA degree holders seem to follow short-term
goals and are more stability-oriented. Also, in more stable industries, it seems more advan-
tageous to employ more experienced CEOs. Our findings also suggest that firm performance
and its variability, or investment policy, are firm outcomes that reflect the consequences of
12The algorithm was developed and improved by Mikusheva (2010).
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implementing unique strategic decisions and contain more of a CEO’s personal imprint. In
contrast, more “automated” or more structured decisions, such as those related to lever-
age or other financing policies that can be based on a firm’s or an industry’s “traditional
knowledge”, on rules of thumb.
We also include measures of CEO power and discretion to study the possible differences
in influence between powerful and non-powerful CEOs. These measures relate to structural
power, i.e. power that stems from the CEO’s position within an organization’s hierarchy. It
is the measures of firm performance and volatility of firm performance for which we obtain
the highest number of statistically significant results. We find that most characteristics
influence the volatility of stock returns. Adding interactions with power generally increases
the influence of a certain characteristic, but this does not happen in a consistent manner.
From power measures, most of the significant results come from interaction with the variable
Founder. This indicates that the most influential dimension of power may be the one that
is proxied for by the founder dummy. Hence, powerful CEOs - especially founders - should
be constrained if the aim is to stabilize the firm, since they are associated with more volatile
firm performance.
The signs and economic significance of robustness results are in line with baseline results,
but statistically significant robustness results are few. Our sample period may be simply
too short to apply firm fixed effects. The 2SLS estimation confirms the role that industry
and CEO experience play in determining firm outcomes, although we cannot exclude the
possibility that there might be a different mechanism behind what we hypothesize as CEOs’
generational membership indirectly influencing firm outcomes. Taking into account the limi-
tations originating from our available choice of instruments, we find that experience variables’
endogeneity is, as expected, an issue in our sample. It is most probably not only firms select-
ing CEOs to match the company’s needs (i.e. CEO-firm matching), but the causality works
in the opposite direction too, provided the CEO leads the company during a sufficient time
period (we imposed a three-year condition).
29
The results can be useful for shareholders concerning corporate governance arrangements
that correspond to the firm’s goals. Observable CEO characteristics are useful indicators of
what to expect from a CEO with a certain characteristic.
30
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CEO Compensation and Experience
2.1 Introduction
CEO compensation is a topic that has generated a vast literature.1 Research questions
involving CEO compensation are very varied and try to tackle the complexity of issues in-
volved in determining CEO pay from different viewpoints. Efficient contracting and the role
of executive labor markets in matching managerial talent with firms’ demand is explored
in, e.g., Murphy and Zábojńık (2004; 2007), Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Edmans at al.
(2009). In weak governance structures, CEOs may set their own pay if they can exercise in-
fluence on the board’s compensation committee. This managerial power, or skimming, view
is supported by findings of, e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000; 2001) and Bebchuk and
Fried (2003; 2004). Murphy (2012) points out that the literature studying the determinants
of CEO compensation can be roughly divided into two groups according to its focus on either
efficient contracting or managerial power but, in the search for a general theory of executive
compensation, rather than viewing these as two competing hypotheses it is more productive
to view them as complements. Murphy (2012) also highlights the role of government inter-
ventions into CEO compensation (often as a consequence of public outrage) in determining
the trends in how companies reward their CEOs.
1Murphy (1999), Core et al. (2002), Frydman and Jenter (2010) and Murphy (2012) are some of the
prominent survey articles. Frydman and Saks (2010) explore the determinants of CEO pay in a long-term
perspective.
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Evidently, there is a complex interaction of determinants of CEO pay that come from
inside (shareholders represented by boards’ compensation committees versus the CEO, the
firms’ head strategist, as their agent) or outside (government, society) the firm. Whether or
how this interaction is able to ensure effective contracts that attract, motivate and retain
CEOs is not the prime line of investigation in our paper. Our point of departure is that
markets for executives are efficient and determine compensation as a return to - among other
factors - work experience.
We study the role of lifetime work experience in determining CEO compensation. In line
with the work of Mincer (1974) which builds on Becker’s (1964) human capital theory, we
define experience as the human capital acquired during post-schooling years through par-
ticipation in the labor market. Thus, CEO compensation reflects the return to the CEO’s
post-schooling investment in human capital. As we study the value and contribution of the
work experience of managers in CEO compensation, we employ three proxies for managerial
experience - company experience, industry experience and CEO experience. These are ob-
servable, simple chronological measures of work experience which assume that the investment
in human capital is continuous and starts after the schooling phase, by participation in the
labor market. In the case of CEOs, the measures proxy for how the CEOs’ managerial ability
develops through time, with job tenure.
Work experience of a CEO is one of the “obvious” factors in CEO pay but the value of our
somewhat “back-to-basics” exercise is in the attempt to quantify this influence from several
viewpoints, as a combination of different measures of experience and different measures of
CEO pay. The empirical model we use is an augmented version of the Mincerian human capi-
tal earnings function, where CEO compensation is a function of managerial experience, other
CEO characteristics, firm characteristics, and time-level, industry-level, firm-level and CEO-
level unobservable heterogeneity. The controls we include reflect attempts to best isolate
the effect of experience on compensation, thus possibly reducing the endogeneity/omitted
variable bias most likely present in our non-experimental (observational) dataset. We find
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that previous work experience, at least the variation captured by length-of-experience mea-
sures, plays a humble role in determining CEO compensation. After controlling for CEO
unobserved heterogeneity, a one-standard-deviation increase in company, industry or CEO
experience comes with an increase of up to 8% for salary and up to 5% for cash compensa-
tion. The increase in total compensation is highest, 25%, when the experience measure is
the length of CEO experience, for the other two measures the effect on total compensation
is approximately 10% lower. The length-of-experience measures do not seem to matter for
stock grants as a component of total compensation. When examining the contribution to
the models’ goodness of fit (R2) of any experience measure as a single factor, the variables’
contribution does not exceed 1%, compensation measures notwithstanding.
We also study the influence of CEO power in combination with CEO experience to see
whether powerful CEOs earn more than their non-powerful counterparts with the same level
of experience. CEOs who are at the same time the chairman of the board or founder CEOs
may earn as much as 20-50% higher total compensation. Conditional on controlling for the
quality of corporate governance, a positive difference between powerful and non-powerful
CEOs would indicate that self-serving CEOs are destroying shareholder value and firms do
not have effectively determined systems of rewarding CEOs. But since we may not control
for all contingencies potentially present in the link between CEO power and CEO pay, we
cannot dismiss the potential coexistence of optimal CEO compensation which removes agency
problems between shareholders and CEOs but leaves room for CEOs’ rent extraction due to
agency problems between directors and shareholders (Murphy, 2012).
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 discuss the data and the empirical
methodology. We present the results from the regression analysis and the R2 decomposition
analysis in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
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2.2 Data
We use three data sources. Data on CEOs’ experience come from BoardEx. Data on firm-
level controls and CEO compensation are taken from Compustat North America Industrial
Annual (Legacy) and ExecuComp, respectively. Our panel has a total of 6,851 firm-year
observations. It follows 1,469 CEOs in 878 firms from 1992 to 2006. Table 2.1 shows how the
number of firm-CEO observations vary per year throughout the 15-year sample period. The
number of observations grows steadily from 104 in 1992, reaches its peak at 690 observations
in 2004 and declines slightly to 609 in 2006.2
We employ a number of compensation variables, all commonly used in the CEO compensa-
tion literature: salary, cash compensation (the sum of salary and bonus), total compensation
including the value of stock option grants, total compensation including the value of exercised
stock options, and restricted stock grants over total compensation. A detailed overview of
the compensation variables is in Panel A of Table 2.A1 in Appendix 2.1.
We use three measures of managers’ experience - company experience, industry experience
and CEO experience. They represent the length of the CEOs’ labor market experience.3
Company experience is determined by the number of years that the CEO has worked in the
current (public) company in any position. Industry experience is the number of years the
CEO has held any position in the industry of his/her current employer. We use the Fama
and French 49 industry classification. Due to data availability on industry identification, we
are constrained to public firms. CEO experience is the number of years the current CEO
has held a CEO position in any firm (public or private) or industry, including the current
position.4
2The numbers for each year show the maximum number of observations that may enter the regressions,
however this number can be lower depending on the variables that enter the regressions.
3We count the number of months and express them in years, thus introducing more variability in the
measures.
4In the summary statistics, we also include measures of experience that illustrate the individuals’ job
attainment. We count the number of different job positions the current CEO has held throughout all his/her
employment history, the number of industries in which the individual held at least one job position throughout
his/her career, and also the number of CEO appointments up to and including the current CEO position.
These count variables provide more insight into the CEOs’ career experience.
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Following Adams et al. (2005), we employ four measures of CEO power. All of them
are dummy variables. Accumulation of titles equals one if the CEO is at the same time the
chairman of the board of directors. Founder equals one if the CEO is at the same time the
founder of the firm. Only insider equals one if the CEO is the only insider on the board,
i.e. the only board member who is also an employee of the firm, thus possibly having a
firm-related information advantage over the other board members. High-discretion industry
equals one if the firm’s industry belongs to the group of industries identified by Hambrick
and Abrahamson (1995) as industries where managers tend to be least constrained in their
decision-making. Panel B of Table 2.A1 provides an overview of the experience measures and
other CEO-level controls.
At the firm level, we control for firm size, the firm’s opportunity set, firm performance,
firm risk, and the strength of corporate governance (Core et al., 1999; Graham et al., 2012).
The corresponding explanatory variables we employ are sales, the market-to-book ratio (an
average over the preceding five years), return on assets and stock returns, the standard devi-
ation of returns on assets and of stock returns (over the preceding five years), and Gompers
et al.’s (2003) GIM index, respectively. A detailed overview of all firm-level controls can be
found in Panel C of Table 2.A1 in Appendix 2.1.
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables. The table is divided into three
panels, with Panel A presenting the compensation variables.5 We present more compensation
variables than what we report tests on in order to describe the CEOs’ compensation situa-
tion in a more comprehensive manner. The average CEO earns $682.95 thousand (median
$638.75 thousand) and $1.37 million (median $1.03 million) in salary and cash compensation,
respectively. The non-cash compensation variables, however, indicate a much higher varia-
tion. While the average CEO receives $4.295 million in total compensation including option
grants (ExecuComp’s TDC1) and $4.229 million in total compensation including options ex-
5As indicated in the table, all compensation variables and most of the firm-level controls are winsorized
to mitigate the influence of outliers. In the regressions, all compensation measures (the dependent variables)
except the ratio variable are log-transformed.
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ercised (ExecuComp’s TDC2), the median values are about half the size of the mean total
compensation. The share of the value of restricted stock grants in the value of total com-
pensation goes from the average 7% to approximately ten-fold for the maximum values. The
average CEO’s annual salary is nearly 50% of the cash-related compensation and 16% of the
total compensation. The average annual bonus matches the salary in amount but its median
value is about 40% lower. Cash-related compensation represents on average approximately
one third of the CEOs’ total compensation. Not surprisingly, the sample CEO compensation
minimum and maximum reveal a large heterogeneity in CEO compensation outcomes among
firms.
Our average CEO is 56 years old, with 8.91 years of company experience, 9.11 years
of industry experience and 9.81 years of CEO experience. He/she worked in almost nine
job positions in 2 different Fama-French industries before becoming a CEO and the current
CEO position is his/her second CEO position. A large fraction of CEOs, about 70%, are
powerful when it comes to accumulation of titles or working in a high-discretion industry.
The representation of powerful founders or sole insiders on the board is lower, only about
one tenth of the CEOs. Only 23 (1.6%) of all CEOs are female. American CEOs dominate
the sample, they represent 80% of all CEOs. Around a third of CEOs hold an MBA degree.
The availability of ExecuComp data bounds us to the universe of large S&P 1500 firms.
The mean value of sales is more than $4.5 billion, with a large standard deviation and a
median value of $1.4 billion. If we interpret the market-to-book ratio as an indicator of
investment opportunities, the average firm has decent growth opportunities - the mean and
median values for the market-to-book ratio are 2.18 and 1.71, respectively. The measures of
firm performance and risk after winsorization do not exhibit extreme values. The average
return on assets is 6.26% and the average stock return is 15.6%. The mean value of the
GIM index is approximately 9.29 (the median value is 9), with a small standard deviation,
which indicates that the typical company in our sample is rather well-governed, with more
power to shareholders than managers. The GIM index could be viewed as another measure for
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managerial power when looking at it through the dichotomy of shareholders’ versus managers’
power.6
Table 2.3 reports the pairwise correlation coefficients for all potential regressors. The
correlation coefficients between all length-of-experience variables are very strong - close to
1, positive and strongly statistically significant. Thus, we probably do not capture very
different dimensions of the individuals’ work experience with these variables. The positive
correlations between these variables are not surprising: longer careers naturally involve more
company, industry or, eventually, CEO experience since all individuals in the sample become
CEOs.7 Power and experience measures exhibit weak positive associations. The founder
indicator and the three length-of-experience variables display the strongest correlation when
examining power and experience measures, with correlation coefficients close to 0.4 and
significant at the 1% level. The power variables’ correlation coefficients among each other
show close-to-zero correlations, significant at the 1% level. The power measures seem to
proxy for different aspects of CEO power. The correlation coefficients suggest a negative
association between firm size and the length of their CEOs’ company, industry and CEO
experience. The absolute value of all correlation coefficients for the GIM index is below 0.2,
most of them are significant at the 1% level. Better governed firms seem to be be smaller,
riskier, with more investment opportunities and better performance, and seem to have more
experienced CEOs, or founders as CEOs. The right-hand-side variables that appear in the
same regression (considering CEO characteristics as well as firm controls) display overall
low to moderate correlation coefficients. Not taking into account the correlation coefficients
between some of the firm-level controls and their lagged versions which are naturally highly
correlated, most correlation coefficients do not exceed 0.4 in absolute value.
6The lower the value of the GIM index, the more effective the firm’s governance mechanisms are considered
to be. The GIM index adds a point for each restriction that restricts shareholders rights. The maximum
value of the index is 24. (Gompers et al., 2003)
7The correlation results have to be interpreted with an important limitation in mind: the computation
of Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients relies on the assumption of a linear relationship between
two continuous variables. Weak correlation coefficients indicate lack of a linear relationship rather than no
association between the two variables.
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2.3 Empirical methodology
In order to study the explanatory power of experience when it comes to compensation out-
comes, we follow the empirical strategies suggested in Core et al. (1999) and Graham et al.
(2012). Thus, the baseline regression equation is an augmented version of Mincer’s (1974)
human capital earnings function and takes the form:
Ln(Comp)mt = βLn(Exp)(i)mt +X it(−1)γ + τt + µm + ιi + εmt (2.1)
where m, i, and t denote managers (CEOs), firms and years, respectively. Both the
compensation variable, Ln(Comp)mt, and the experience variable, Ln(Exp)(i)mt, are natural-
log-transformed. α is the constant, β is the coefficient of interest, γ is a vector of coefficients
on the firm controls, and εimt is the error term. X it(−1) is a vector of firm-level controls for
firm size, investment opportunities, firm profitability, firm risk and corporate governance. τt,
µm and ιi represent year, CEO and firm fixed effect, respectively.
We build our way towards this specification gradually, so that we can observe the changes
in the coefficients of interests. We start with a simple pooled OLS regression with no fixed
effects, then we perform least squares dummy variable estimation by adding year and in-
dustry dummies. Industry dummies control for time-invariant industry characteristics, such
as long-term industry standards. Next, we pair year dummies with CEO fixed effects, thus
replacing industry dummies. Since we are interested in isolating the effect of experience on
compensation, this is an important step.8 Our goal is to determine the return to experience
and through the log-transformations of the response variable and the explanatory variable,
we impose a constant elasticity model.9 The ultimate specification replaces the CEO fixed
8In unreported regressions - in tests without CEO fixed effects - we include several CEO-level controls, such
as the US dummy, the female indicator, or the MBA degree indicator. Possibly due to less observations or a
small between variation in these observable CEO characteristics, we do not find their coefficients significant.
The conclusions from the reported tests are qualitatively unaffected and quantitatively very similar to the
additional, unreported ones.
9Alternatively, we could replace the log-transformed experience measure with the measure and its a
squared term (an alternative for capturing non-linearity), and impose thus concavity in experience-related
CEO compensation.
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effects in the latter specification with joint CEO and firm fixed effects (spell effects; Graham
et al., 2012). We are not interested in the CEO and firm fixed effects separately. We only
employ them to better isolate the effect of experience on compensation and address the omit-
ted variable bias. The joint fixed effects estimation is also better supported by our relatively
small sample, since instead of accounting for each CEO and firm separately, we only need
to identify the unique CEO and firm pairs (1,469 CEO and 878 firm dummies for separate
CEO and firm effects versus 1,478 CEO-firm pair dummies for their joint fixed effects).10
The number of CEOs who during the sample period start a new CEO job in one of the firms
in the sample (henceforth referred to as “in-sample movers”) is very small, only 0.61% (9
out of 1469 CEOs). This implies that results from CEO fixed effects estimation probably do
not differ substantially from firm fixed effects estimation. Hence, we do not expect a large
change in results when moving from estimation with CEO fixed effect to spell effects.
We regress several compensation measures on each of the experience measures separately.
The three length-of-experience variables - company experience, industry experience and CEO
experience - allow us to seize the advantages of employing CEO fixed effects in compensation
regressions. They exhibit sufficient variation through time and within subjects which is an
important consideration when we employ CEO fixed effects. If the explanatory variable of
interest does not change over time or if it changes slowly, controlling for unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneities is detrimental to the goal of the research.11 Graham et al. (2012)
study the importance of including manager and firm fixed effects in compensation regressions
as an empirical methodology to effectively address omitted variable bias issues but point
out its limitations in function of the time-invariability of both the main regressors and the
potential omitted variables.
10To clearly express this idea, we could replace µm and ιi in Eq. (2.1) with φp, joint CEO and firm fixed
effects, where p stands for unique firm-CEO pairs.
11Recall that we include three job-attainment experience measures in the descriptive statistics to capture
a bit more of the CEOs’ job market experience. After the newly appointed CEO commences his/her top
managerial career, the variation in these measures is minimal. The lack of variation in the job-attainment
measures does not allow for using them as alternatives to the length-of-experience measures and successfully
employ CEO or firm fixed effects. The fixed effects would wipe out the effect of these measures on CEO pay.
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When controlling for managerial power in addition to professional experience, least square
dummy variable regressions which include year and industry dummies are our benchmark
regressions:
Ln(Comp)mt = α+β0Ln(Exp)(i)mt+β1Pwrmit+β2Log(Exp)(i)mtPwrmit+X it(−1)γ+τt+δd+εmt
(2.2)
where d identifies company i ’s industry (Fama and French 49 classification) and δd repre-
sents industry dummies. Due to collinearity issues, we do not include the industry dummies
in the regressions when High-discretion industry is the power measure. Pwrmit stands for
one of the four measures of managerial power and Log(Exp)(i)mtPwrmit is the interaction
term between experience (firm, industry or CEO experience) and power. The three betas
are now the coefficients of interest. A three-way fixed effects model from Eq. (2.1) is of
limited use in this case since the managerial power measures are virtually time-invariant.
The disadvantage of the specification in Eq. (2.2) is that it re-raises concerns about omitted
variables. We can however compare the coefficient estimates for the other regressors and see
whether their signs, magnitudes and significance change substantially. If so, omitted variable
bias may be an important issue and can be dealt with more advanced estimation methods
such as instrumental variables estimation. In all regressions, we include the same firm-level
controls (observable time-variant variables), hence the comparison is straightforward.
The interpretation of the β1 coefficient in Eq. (2.2) is conditional on including the inter-
action term and may not be very meaningful or useful since it expresses the effect of power
on CEO compensation when the CEO has zero years of experience. If we think of first-time
CEOs and external hires into a new industry, the interpretation is viable. But a perhaps
more interesting case can be made when looking at the effects of power on compensation
for more experienced CEOs. Accordingly, we transform the experience measures by centring
them around their sample means (for each observation, we subtract the sample mean from
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the experience value).12 The β1 coefficient may now also be closer to expressing the uncon-




As measures of CEO compensation, we originally consider eight ExecuComp measures (Ta-
ble 3.1). However, we report regressions results for only half of them: Salary, Cash compen-
sation, Total compensation 2 (includes the value of stock options exercised) and Stock grants
over Total compensation 2. Results from employing these variables as response variables are
sufficiently illustrative of the effect of experience on CEO compensation in our setting.
Unless stated otherwise, for the log-transformed length-of-experience variables, the re-
ported effects correspond to a one-standard-deviation change in the experience variable in
proportion to the sample mean. This change is 0.92, 0.93 and 0.83 for Company experience,
Industry experience and CEO experience, respectively. The approximate estimated elasticity
of compensation with respect to experience is evident from the coefficient estimates.13
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 report results from regressions with cash-related compensation. The
pooled OLS (Col. 1-3) and the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) regressions results (Col.
4-6) suggest that the effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in company experience and
industry experience is very similar for both salary and cash compensation, approximately
3%, for CEO experience it is 2%. After controlling for CEO fixed effects (Col. 7-9), the
effect of all three experience measures on salary increases to about 7%, at the 1% level of
statistical significance. The spell effect estimation (Col. 10-12) effectively does not introduce
a considerable change in the estimates, the estimates are slightly lower but still close to 7%.
12We only transform the experience variables once. We do not transform the centred variables further by
log-transformation.
13Through the log-transformation of the compensation and experience variables, we employ a constant
elasticity model. In this model, the relative differentials in earnings are the same at any level of experience.
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The positive effect of company experience on cash compensation is somewhat lower than that
on salary: 4.9% with CEO fixed effects and 4.4% with spell effects. For industry experience,
the estimated effects are 4.5% and 4%, respectively. The corresponding effect of an increase
in CEO experience is about 4% but this result, unlike the previous strongly statistically
significant results (at 1%), is significant only at the 10% level of significance.
The main results in Table 2.6 are strongly statistically significant for all measures of
experience. When controlling for CEO time-invariant unobserved heterogeneities, the effect
of more company and industry experience increases, from approximately 8% to 12-13%. CEO
experience seems to have a considerably large effect on CEO total compensation including
options exercised. The magnitude of the coefficient increases fivefold, from 5% in the pooled
OLS regressions (Col. 1-3) and 6% in the LSDV regressions with year and industry dummies
(Col. 4-6), to 25% when we include CEO fixed effects (Col. 7-9) or spell effects (Col. 10-12).
In the spell effects regressions, the estimated coefficient are always slightly lower than with
CEO fixed effects only.
Table 2.7 shows the results from regressions on the fraction of restricted stock grants
in total compensation (TDC2). The coefficients on all experience values suggest a small
negative effect of approximately 1% at the 1% level of significance but this effect disappears
as soon as we control for CEO fixed effects (separately or jointly with firm fixed effects).
The results suggest that even almost double the firm or industry experience may not bring
about a dramatic effect on CEO pay (up to 8% and 13.5% for cash-related compensation and
total compensation, respectively) but the effect is still considerable. For determining cash-
related compensation, firm and industry experience appear as relevant as CEO experience.
None of the three experience measures, however, seems to factor in granting stocks to CEOs as
part of their total compensation. When it comes to total compensation, it is CEO experience
that matters more - we see economically significant changes in CEOs’ total compensation
related to increases in CEO experience. With a one-standard-deviation increase in CEO
experience (i.e. almost double the CEO experience), the total compensation including options
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exercised increases by approximately one quarter. We observe often large increases in the
coefficient estimates on the experience measures after controlling for CEO and spell fixed
effects. This suggests, in line with the findings of Graham et al. (2012), that unobserved
time-invariant CEO and firm heterogeneity as determinants of CEO pay are important in
their own right. Due to the potential complexity of interactions between our experience
variables and the factors captured by fixed effects, it is hard to perform expected bias analysis
of the experience variables’ coefficients and address why the experience coefficients seem
underestimated when fixed effects are omitted from the regression.
In Panel A of Table 2.8, we expand the specifications presented in Table 2.6 and control for
CEO power. All groups of three coefficients - experience measure, power measure and their
interaction - are jointly statistically significant at the 1% level. A one-standard-deviation
increase in company experience, industry experience or CEO experience increases Total com-
pensation 2 of powerful CEOs compared to the base group of CEOs (i.e. CEOs with no
given type of experience and no power) on average by around 29 to 36% when controlling for
accumulation of titles, by 29 to 55% when controlling for founders, by around 5 to 6% for
sole insiders, and by approximately 17% for CEOs in a high-discretion industry. The results
continue to show a solid role of experience in determining pay but power seems to matter
too, most significantly in the case of chairman CEOs and founder CEOs. As much as one
third of CEOs’ total compensation may be due to standing in a powerful role. We find the
effect of power on total compensation to be strongest for the combination founders and CEO
experience. The total compensation of a founder CEO with no previous CEO experience
compared to a non-founder CEO with no CEO experience is almost 60% higher.
Panel B of Table 2.8 reports results from regressions where the experience measures are
centred around the sample mean, i.e. CEOs with average experience determined by the sam-
ple mean and no power now represent the base group. The effect of a one-standard-deviation
increase in experience for non-powerful CEOs is comparable to the ones in Panel A: between
4 and 12% for company experience and industry experience, and between 2 and 7% for CEO
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experience. The effect of power on total compensation for CEOs with average experience
is lower compared to the results from Panel A, except for only-insider CEOs. Chairman
CEOs with average experience earn in total around 20% more compared to non-chairman
CEOs with average experience. For founder CEOs and CEOs in a high-discretion industry
this difference is negative, approximately -2 and -1%, respectively. CEOs who are the only
insiders on the board earn around 13% more compared to non-powerful CEOs with the same
(average) experience. The overall difference for a one-standard-deviation increase in experi-
ence over the average experience for powerful CEOs compared to the base group amounts
to approximately 20% for chairman CEOs and only insiders. In high-discretion industries,
the difference is smaller, between 1 and 6%. The overall difference in total compensation
between founder CEOs and the base group CEOs, after a one-standard-deviation increase
in experience over average experience, is negative. They earn 9 to 10% less on average than
non-founder CEOs with the same experience. The joint significance tests of experience and
power measures (and their interaction terms) indicate a statistical significance of 1% for
regressions in Columns (1)-(8). The trio of coefficients in Column (12) is not jointly statis-
tically significant at conventional levels. The remaining trios of coefficients (Columns 9-11)
are jointly statistically significant at the 5% level. In the Panel B results just like in Panel
A, power again largely modifies the effects of experience.14
The results suggest that powerful CEOs may be awarded significantly higher overall com-
pensation than non-powerful CEOs, even after controlling for the strength of corporate gov-
14Unlike in Panel A, in Panel B of Table 2.8, after centring the experience variables around their sample
mean, we find negative overall effects on CEO pay when experience (of powerful CEOs) increases. The increase
refers to approximately 8-9 years of experience over the average 9-10 years of experience. The overall negative
effect may be driven by a decreasing return to the CEOs’ experience (a prediction of the theory of optimal
allocation of investment in human capital). The latter is in line with Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) pointing
out that too long CEO tenure may damage firm performance due to CEO’ loss of flexibility and their tendency
to take over decision-making, and citing Vancil (1987) that ten years is commonly considered the “right”
CEO tenure. We could test this with an alternative specification to Eq. (2.2), where Ln(Exp) is replaced
by the non-transformed experience measure and a quadratic term of experience to capture the diminishing
effects of experience. By including a quadratic, we impose the existence of a turning point: after reaching a
certain amount of experience, the pay starts to decrease. Since we force the turning point to happen, we need
to examine whether the resulting turning-point level of experience is reasonable. If the fraction of individuals
in the sample who have more experience than the turning-point level is low, this imposition is not of a great
concern when interpreting the results.
64
ernance through the GIM index. This may be an indication that higher CEO pay as a
consequence of agency problems between shareholders and directors (the compensation com-
mittee) potentially coexists with “good” corporate governance, i.e. even if agency issues
between shareholders and CEOs are rather successfully resolved.
2.4.2 R2 decomposition analysis
It is common practice for researchers to focus the regression analysis on the individual re-
gressors. The coefficient estimates and their statistical significance are reported. R2 is the
common goodness-of-fit measures, it represents the proportion of variability in the data that
is accounted for by the statistical model.15 These elements of regression analysis often carry
the only information concerning the regressors’ relevance in a given model. Decomposition
analysis may be used to study further the information contents of explanatory variables and
their relative “importance” or “relevance” in a model. Despite its potential in supplementing
regression analysis, R2 decomposition is not commonly reported in applied work. Through
R2 decomposition, we may also obtain an overview of the “contributions” of a large group
of factors, such as a large number of dummy variables, reporting on which otherwise would
not be viable.16
If R2 is computed as cov(yit, ŷit)/var(yit), the R
2 contribution of one of the factors, xit,
in the multiple regression is determined as cov(yit, xitβ̂)/var(yit), where yit is the dependent
variable, ŷit its fitted value, xit is the regressor of interest, and β̂ is the coefficient estimate
on this regressor. The weights/contributions associated with each regressor and with the
residuals add up to 100%. Through the R2 decomposition based on normalized covariance
we may encounter instances of negative R2 contribution. Although counter-intuitive, this is
a computational consequence of the fact that there is a covariance in the numerator of the
formula for computing the R2 contribution, i.e. not all regressors’ effects in our model move in
15We report the adjusted R2 which deals with the R2 inflation phenomenon through penalizing the R2
statistic for including more regressors in the specification.
16For example, Graham et al. (2012), use decomposition analysis in unravelling the relative importance of
including firm and/or CEO fixed effects in their model.
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the same direction. In fact, this is what we observe with our experience measures in nearly all
specifications when computing their share in the explained portion of the regressions (R2) as
normalized covariance. The contributions of our length-of-experience variables are, beyond
the negative signs, very small, under 0.5% , expressed as a percentage of R2. After the
specifications control for CEO and/or firm fixed effects, the contributions decrease towards
zero. The summed contributions of the three regressors - length of experience, power measure
and their interaction term - are slightly higher, often positive. The highest weights in R2,
between 1 and 1.5% are attributed to the trio of coefficients with accumulation of titles
as the power measure. This makes sense as these CEOs may receive higher compensation
from holding two functions. The joint contributions with founder as the power measure
is around 1%, with only insider and high-discretion industry it becomes under 0.5%. The
contributions do not vary substantially according to the dependent variables but they tend
to be fractionally higher for total compensation and stock grants over total compensation.
In line with the findings of Graham et al. (2012), including CEO and firm fixed effects
considerably improves our CEO compensation model’s goodness of fit (R2). The contribution
of CEO fixed effects to the model’s R2 varies between 30-40%, and the contribution of firm
fixed effects between 20-30%.17
Huettner and Sunder (2012) suggest an alternative way to decompose R2: a decompo-
sition of goodness-of-fit measures based on Shapley and Owen values. These are notions
born in game theory and offer a possibility of R2 decomposition under a feasible set of ax-
ioms. Huettner and Sunder (2012) explain that the Shapley value decomposition allows for
distributing the goodness of fit of the model among the regressors such that it takes into
account the interaction between regressors in sub-models and is calculated on the basis of
information on the same type of goodness of fit in these sub-models.18 The Owen value is
a generalization of the Shapley value and allows for group-wise decomposition, useful when
17These contributions are computed with either CEO fixed effects or firm fixed effect included separately
in the regression. With joint CEO and firm fixed effects (spell effect), the contribution to R2 is around 40%.
18Huettner and Sunder (2012) explain in detail the computation of the Shapley and Owen values.
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determining the joint contribution of exogenously grouped regressors, such as firm-level con-
trols, year dummies, industry dummies or CEO dummies. The advantages of this approach
are several: insensitivity to transformation of variables if the goodness-of-fit measure is also
insensitive, variables that contribute nothing to the goodness of fit in all sub-models receive
the value zero, the Owen value corresponding to a exogenously given group is a sum of the
values attributed to the individual variables through the Shapley value decomposition.
The Shapley and Owen value decompositions are computationally more demanding than
the first, normalized-covariance approach we used.19 The specifications with experience,
firm-level controls, year dummies and industry dummies represent the maximum number of
regressors we can computationally afford. The Shapley/Owen value decomposition returns
no negative contributions. Our experience measures contribute less than 1% to the models’
R2, often this contribution is below 0.5%. For stock grants over total compensation as the
dependent variable, we find that the contribution of experience as a share of R2 increases to
between one-tenth and one-fifth. These are the results for the most “complete” computation-
ally viable specification with length-of-experience measures where we include year dummies
and industry dummies.
The Owen value decomposition for the group of regressor variables containing the expe-
rience measure, power measure and their interaction term, suggests that the contributions of
the power groups are as much as 4-6% if accumulation of titles is the power measure, 3-5%
for founders, under 1-2% for only insiders, and under 1.5% for high-discretion industries.
This holds if the dependent variables are salary, cash compensation or total compensation.
The highest contribution values come from regressions with total compensation as the de-
pendent variable, and accumulation of titles as the power measure. The contributions are,
again, considerably higher (around one-fifth) for all power groups when stock grants over
total compensation is used as the compensation measure. The most “complete” computa-
tionally viable specification with power measures includes year dummies only; no industry,
19In Stata, we perform the computations using the modules gfields for decomposition based on normalized
covariance and rego for Shapley/Owen value decompositions.
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firm or CEO dummies are included.
2.5 Conclusion
We study the role of lifetime work experience, proxied for by three length-of-experience mea-
sures, as a determinant of CEO compensation. Company, industry and CEO experience
matter equally for cash-related compensation (salary, cash compensation) while CEO expe-
rience matters more when we look at the whole compensation package. None of the three
experience measures seems to factor significantly in awarding stock grants as a component
of total compensation. It is reasonable to assume that the managerial abilities of CEOs de-
velop through time and the return to the accumulated human capital increases accordingly,
but we also find indication that the notion of decreasing returns to experience holds for the
case of chief executive officers too. Powerful CEOs (chairman CEOs, founders) seem to have
room for rent-extraction through compensation but this finding is conditional on disentan-
gling the “misuse of power” from accordingly rewarded personal qualities or superior ability
that the power measures may capture. We do not exclude the possibility that this finding
arises as a consequence of omitted variable bias. Furthermore, higher CEO compensation
may also coexist with addressed or reduced agency problems between shareholders and CEOs
when it stems from agency problems between shareholders and directors (the compensation
committee of the board) responsible for setting CEO pay (Murphy, 2012).
We extend the usual regression analysis of relationships in the data through R2 decompo-
sition in order to learn more about the contributions of the regressor factors to the proportion
of variation in the data that is explained by the statistical model. We find that, based on
normalized-covariance R2 decomposition, the sole contributions of our length-of-experience
measures are low, under 1%. When the joint contribution of the length-of-experience mea-
sure, power measure and their interaction term is considered, the contributions do not exceed
1.5%. The Shapley and Owen value decompositions also point to contributions under 1% for
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the length-of-experience measures but under 6% for the power groups.
In the light of recent findings on the changing character of markets for CEOs, the re-
sults are not surprising.20 In our measures, for example, the proportion of transferable and
non-transferable (firm-specific) capital in the CEOs’ accumulated human capital is unclear.
Since we lack more comprehensive measures of CEOs’ work experience that would capture
the qualitative differences between individuals in their post-schooling investment in human
capital, just like in Mincer (1974, p. 95), we might understate the potential explanatory
power of the distribution of CEO’s work experience. It is also viable to posit that after
“classifying” for a certain level of job attainment (i.e. the individual is “talented enough” to
become a CEO), the potential weighs more than the track record. What makes the signif-
icant difference for pay is then not the accumulated work experience but the unobservable
characteristics (e.g., an exceptional personality, social connections, attitude towards risk).
When we account for time-invariant unobservable CEO characteristics, the results indeed
suggest that the variation beyond lifetime work experience plays a very important role in
explaining CEO compensation. Even though unobservable CEO heterogeneity comes ahead
as a more significant factor of CEO pay, we establish awareness of the role of work experience
as a determinant of CEO compensation.
20General transferable managerial ability (Murphy and Zábojńık, 2004, 2007; Custódio et al., 2012) or
charismatic leadership (Khurana, 2002) that helps maintain good investor relations in an environment of
highly scrutinized communication are found to come at a significant CEO pay premium.
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Do the Initial Job Market Conditions
Really Matter for CEO Pay?
3.1 Introduction
In efficient labor markets, fair compensation is a relevant consideration. Efficient labor
markets should recognize the difference between skill and luck, and should not punish for
adverse circumstances beyond an individual’s control. Recent research studying different
niches of the labor market, however, finds that initial job conditions such as the phase
of the business cycle (exogenous shocks) may determine the long-term success of a career
(Oyer, 2006, 2008; Kahn, 2010; Kwon et al., 2010). Should individuals be concerned about
carrying a bad signal (stigma) due to exogenous shocks to the economy at their career start?
We find that the answer may depend on the niche of the labor market.
Despite being seen as an increasingly competitive market (e.g., Murphy, 2012), the exec-
utive job market has not been found immune to shortcomings when it comes to rewarding
CEOs. For example, CEOs may be rewarded or penalized for exogenous firm performance
shocks beyond their control. As for the upside outcomes, weak governance structures create
room for rent extraction by CEOs (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Garvey and Mil-
bourn, 2006), for the downside outcomes, there may be instances of “unfair” CEO dismissal
(Jenter and Kanaan, 2012). We examine the existence and persistence of cohort effects
in compensation for individuals who at some point in their career become CEOs. We ask
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whether current success, proxied for by current CEO compensation, depends on initial place-
ment success as measured by first firm size. In particular, is the quality of a future CEO’s
very first job (better initial placement) reflected in higher current compensation? Our results
suggest that it is not the case. After controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity, successful
initial placement does not seem to matter for current CEO compensation. In instrumental
variables regressions, the results are even less supportive of the existence of procyclical cohort
effects for CEOs. This finding is robust to different measures of firm size and regression spec-
ifications. We find, however, a stronger promotion effect for luckier managers. Although it is
established in the literature that promotions come with large wage increases (e.g., Gibbons
and Waldman, 1999), CEOs who get hired from a top-ranked firm, graduated in favourable
economic times, or started their first job in a good economy receive on average a higher first
compensation than individuals whose career start is marked by recession. This promotion
effect seems to dissipate over time.1 CEOs who start in recessions seem to have as good
career prospects and be as well rewarded as their boom counterparts. Furthermore, results
from instrumental variables estimation suggest, at odds with findings of procyclical effects
from other cohort effects research, that “recession CEOs” receive higher CEO pay than CEOs
who entered the job market in good economic times. Robustness results confirm this finding.
We proxy for firm quality with firm size and associate larger firms with higher productivity
and better organizational practices. Whether it is becoming a CEO of a larger firm or just
starting a career in a larger firm, we consider working at larger firms a proxy for a more
successful career. Starting out at larger, busier firms offers more opportunities for learning
and human capital accumulation (the opportunity to work on many different projects) and
promotion (Gibbons and Waldman, 2006). Research shows that better managers tend to
work for larger firms and CEOs in larger firms earn more: in highly competitive markets for
managerial talent, even a relatively small difference in managerial talent can bring significant
1Compared to previous studies that are observationally constrained to follow individuals often for only up
to 10-15 years, we are able to observe careers for a longer time. For about half of the individuals in our full
sample, the observational period is more than 20 years.
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benefits to larger firms (Rosen, 1982; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Terviö, 2008). Market
capitalization - the market value of equity - is our primary firm size measure since it also
reflects the markets’ evaluation of the firm’s future prospects.2
We instrument the quality of the first CEO job by using several indicators of the overall
economic situation at the time the CEO took up his first CEO engagement. We establish
that, conditional on the controls included in the regression, the economic conditions at the
time of the first job have no effect on CEO pay other than the effect through first job quality.
Thus, we exploit the variation in the indicators for the overall economic situation as a source
of exogenous variation in first job quality, and investigate a causal link going from first job
quality to current job quality.
Instrumental variables estimation also alleviates concerns of selection bias and endogene-
ity. All individuals in our dataset make it to the “present” (1992-2007) as CEOs, so this
achievement is “guaranteed” to happen in the data. Thus we cannot really study cohort
effects on a full scale of success in careers by involving and comparing to individuals who
never climb the job ladder to a CEO position. We can only see if the individuals have a
more or less successful CEO career. Also, we are not able to follow all future public-firm
CEOs for the same amount of time. The first job is any first assignment in the individ-
ual’s career for which we have firm-related data, so here again we are constrained to public
firms. CEOs fall out of our observational data, fired, retired, moving to a non-public firm
or to a non-CEO job, or due to other (e.g., personal) reasons but only after they become
CEOs. The possibility that endogenous choices of individuals drive the results requires a
careful selection of controls when performing pooled OLS, least square dummy variable or
fixed effects estimation, and credible choices when it comes to instruments for instrumental
variables estimation. The instrumental variables should influence the dependent variable of
2Gabaix and Landier (2008) argue in favour of using full market capitalization (total value of debt plus
equity) to predict CEO compensation from the point of view of their model (under the supposition that the
contribution of managerial talent to the firm’s future earnings is permanent, as opposed to temporary) but
also based on empirical data analysis. Given that the market value of equity is the main source of variation
in firms’ market values, our choice of market capitalization of equity for the proxy for firm size and success
is a highly substitutable alternative.
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interest only indirectly (valid instruments) while being highly correlated with our endogenous
variables (strong instruments).
As robustness checks, we perform cross-sectional regressions to check for the stability
of coefficient estimates, instrumental variables regressions with an alternative set of instru-
ments, and weak-instrument-robust instrumental variables regressions based on conditional
likelihood ratio confidence intervals. The findings from the robustness analysis suggest coun-
tercyclical cohort effects in CEO compensation.
Several recent papers study cohort effects (in pay, in job rankings, in promotions) in
labor markets for college graduates, PhD economists, investment bankers, executives, blue-
or white-collar workers. Oyer (2006) provides evidence on career stickiness for economist
with a PhD degree. Academics who enter the job market in a recession tend to work for
lower-ranked institutions years later, have lower research output, and are offered less tenure-
tracked positions. Oyer (2008) finds that MBA investment bankers who start careers on
Wall Street during bullish stock markets are more likely to keep their prestigious position
in the long term, and their earnings are substantially higher than those of MBA graduates
whose prospects were diminished by adverse stock market shocks. Kahn’s (2010) results
show that white male US college graduates who graduate in downturns are at a disadvantage
which translates into significantly lower wages in the medium to long term (as much as two
decades into their careers), and worse career prospects. According to Kwon et al. (2010), the
employment growth rate, rather than the unemployment rate which is widely used in cohort
effects studies, becomes more relevant in determining long-term job attainment. Workers
entering the job market in a recovery phase of a business cycle earn more and get promoted
faster than those who enter during the peak.
In terms of the niche labor market they study, Schoar and Zuo (2012) is the paper closest
to ours. Their results suggest, again, long-term cohort effects present in the executive (CEO)
job market. “Recession CEOs”, i.e. CEOs who started their careers in a recession year, work
on average for smaller companies, and switch less between companies or industries. They are
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promoted faster to become CEOs but their first CEO compensation is lower in comparison
to “non-recession CEOs”. Their management styles tend to be more conservative: they hold
less debt, invest less, tend to diversify across segments, and their firms have lower stock
return volatility. While our focus is on the long-term consequences of first job quality for
CEO pay, Schoar and Zuo (2012) study the implications of being a “recession CEO” for
the CEO’s career path, first CEO compensation, and for the strategic decision-making in
firms with these CEOs. The setup for capturing the link from “then” (at the start of the
individual’s career) to “now” (the developments in the individual’s CEO career) is different.
We instrument the first job quality measure by a wider array of measures for initial job
market conditions, and consider implications for CEO pay only. Schoar and Zuo (2012)
study a variety of response variables but use a single indicator variable, instrumented by the
individual’s age, for conditions at the start of the individual’s career.
The findings from the research on cohort effects are puzzling in that they all point to-
wards an unexplained persistent effect of the start-of-career macroeconomic conditions on
individuals’ careers. Those who begin in booms seem to get more options for career develop-
ment, reflected also in their higher earnings (procyclical effects).3 But the persistence story
may have many layers. Even if the workings of a suitable underlying model are yet to be
attributed and tested, partial potential explanations are of importance at this point.
According to Kahn (2010), the relative importance of human capital disparities at the
career start, and the ease with which they can be overcome determines how persistent initial
effects are. Arguments concerning persistence versus non-persistence of first job effects can
also be boiled down to a “born or made” (Oyer, 2008), “nature (selection) or nurture (im-
printing)” (Schoar and Zuo, 2012), “skills or luck” (Oyer, 2006) discussion. As Oyer (2008)
puts it, if starting to work on Wall Street, an opportunity that is more easily attainable in
booms, causes one to work there later on, then investment bankers are “made” rather than
“born” to work on Wall Street. In the context of CEO careers and the business cycle, due to
3Certainly, individuals realizing this may time their job market entry to favourable economic times. This
endogeneity issue should be kept in mind when performing empirical tests.
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early career experience, managers may acquire a certain set of skills (different for recession
and non-recession managers) and the given cohort of managers becomes more apt to manage
firms either during recessions or during booms. Schoar and Zuo (2012) name it the “imprint-
ing effect” and point out its role in determining the supply of managers in each cohort. They
distinguish this effect from the “selection effect”, when there are managers with different sets
of skills in each cohort. Firms and managers (CEOs) then match and re-match according to
their needs and abilities along the business cycle.4
In a deeper look at the theories that provide possible explanations for why initial place-
ment may have long-term effects on one’s career, Kwon et al. (2010) distinguish between
productivity-based and non-productivity-based theories of cohort effects. Productivity-based
theories suggest that starting a career in a good economy, with a better first job, allows to
learn more and develop higher-than-average productivity, and be rewarded by higher-than-
average pay in the long run. Firm-specific human capital, or rather task-specific human
capital (Gibbons and Waldman, 2004; 2006) developed through more advanced on-the-job
training in better quality institutions may make it more advantageous for an individual to
continue working for the same (type of) better-quality firm. Initial match quality, however,
can generate procyclical or countercyclical cohort effects. In the procyclical view, more jobs
available during booms allow workers to find better matches. An argument for countercycli-
cal cohort effects is that during recessions, when there are less jobs available, firms are at an
advantage. The selection process is more careful, firms find better matches (more productive
employees) for the positions they offer and reward them with higher pay. Non-productivity-
based theories suggest that downward rigidity in jobs, long-term contracts, or signalling may
cause procyclical cohort effects without the existence of productivity disparities between co-
horts. Employees hired during recessions may be more willing to sign long-term contracts
4If the latter effect is at work in the executive labor market, we will probably not find evidence on persistent
influence of initial market conditions. Also, if managers are formed - lastingly “imprinted” - early on in their
careers, then if a recession hits in the middle of their careers (for example, at the time they take up their first
CEO assignment), it will not have long-run consequences for them. In additional, here unreported work, we
perform tests on the persistence of first CEO job effects and find no statistically significant results.
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with lower long-term wages (consistent with findings of Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991). Also,
the job market may fail to account for the role of luck in the first placement and the first job
may be considered a strong signal of the individual’s ability (Waldman, 1984) even though
it could represent a systematic non-rational behaviour of markets (Oyer, 2006).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data and
Section 3.3 explains our empirical methodology choices. The results and their interpretation
as well as a robustness analysis are presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
Data-wise we are limited to examining public firms only. Data availability due to reporting
requirements and more transparency demanded by regulators from these firms gives us a kind
of an “efficiency” advantage. CEOs of these firms find themselves under more public scrutiny
and under the spotlight of financial markets. We are interested in whether this scrutiny can
ensure that it is the CEOs’ managerial ability rather than lucky circumstances that shape
their career path.
The data for our panel with 13,378 firm-year observations come from several sources.5
Data on firm financials come from Compustat North America Industrial Annual, and for
financial markets related data from CRSP. Data on CEOs’ profile come from BoardEx and
are complemented with compensation data from Execucomp. Further, we gather data from
the Federal Reserve (interest rates), National Bureau for Economic Research (recession in-
dicators) and U.S. Bureau for Labor Statistics (unemployment) to build our instrumental
variables. The dataset follows 1,473 publicly listed companies from the S&P 1500 universe
and their 2,184 CEOs throughout 16 years, from 1992 to 2007.
We apply two conditions to the full sample: the CEO has to be present in the firm for
at least 3 years (Bertrand and Schoar’s (2003) condition for a CEO to leave an imprint on
5We perform tests with a full sample and several subsamples. Table 3.A1 in Appendix 3.1 summarizes
the conditions applied to the full sample and subsamples.
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the company), and we take into account only non-financial firms, i.e. observations for firms
with two-digit SIC codes from 60 to 69 are dropped. Less than 1% (0.87%) of CEOs in our
sample appear as CEOs in another firm of the sample.6
The summary statistics for the full sample and the pairwise correlations for the potential
right-hand-side variables are presented in Table 3.1 and in Table 3.A3 in Appendix 3.3,
respectively. The variables computed in a ratio form or variables more prone to measurement
error are winsorized to mitigate the influence of outliers. We apply winsorization below the
1st percentile and above the 99th percentile.
First firm size refers to the size of the firm at the time of our individuals’ first job
assignment for which data is available on his/her employer - a public company. For a more
complete characterization of our future CEOs’ first employment, there are four measures of
“first firm size” that appear in the statistical description of the data in Table 3.1: First
Market Capitalization, First Total Assets, First Sales and First Number of Employees.7 We
report regression results with only two of them, First Market Capitalization and First Total
Assets. Since we focus on the success in publicly listed companies, we consider market
capitalization, our market-related measure, the most relevant measure for first firm size and
quality. The correlation coefficient between First Market Capitalization and our alternative
firm size measure, First Total Assets, is 0.881.
Given the availability of compensation data in Execucomp, we follow CEOs at S&P
1500 companies. The average firm at the time of our individuals’ first assignment as a
6As we discuss in more detail below, because of the small percentage of within-sample movers, accounting
for firm fixed effects almost coincides with employing managerial fixed effects.
7All four are commonly used in the literature but they are not interchangeable and may produce divergent
conclusions in different settings (Smyth et al., 1975; Shalit and Sankar, 1977). Unreported in Table 3.A3 in
Appendix 3.3, the four firm size measures are highly correlated in-sample. The strongest correlation arises
between First Total Assets and First Sales (0.936), and the weakest between First Market Capitalization and
First Number of Employees (0.742). Sales is a measure less susceptible to accounting manipulation than total
assets but there are less observations available - the first year of data availability for the variable ”SALE” in
Compustat is 1975. Another non-accounting measure, number of employees, has a ”long intellectual tradition”
(Rajan et al., 2001). Because of the connection to the stock market, however, market capitalization seems
the most relevant measure for our public firms’ sizes. Moreover conclusions from regressions with First Sales
or First Number of Employees are qualitatively very close to those with First Total Assets and we do not
report these results.
92
CEO in a public company has a market capitalization of $2.57 billion (median value $434.5
million), total assets of $2.27 billion (median value $368.6 million), annual sales of $30.5
million (median value $5.86 million), and employs 2.13 million employees (median 412,220
employees).
As controls at the firm-level, we include those that appear in the compensation regressions
of Graham et al. (2012): lagged market capitalization or lagged total assets, lagged market
to book, stock return and lagged stock return, return on assets and lagged return on assets,
and stock return volatility.8 The pairwise correlations between firm-level controls are rather
low, with the exception of variables and their lagged versions and the alternative firm size
measures. The correlation coefficients between current firm size and first firm size measures
are moderate (between 0.33 - 0.425) which may be caused by persistence in firm size dynamics
- the minimum time difference between “current” and “first” in the full sample is one year.
We address this issue through subsamples, by applying the condition that this difference is
at least 10 years.
We use two measures for CEO compensation. Execucomp’s TDC1 comprises of several
components in a CEO compensation package: Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, Total Value of
Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options Granted (using the Black and Scholes
option valuation model), Long-Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total. TDC2 adds the
Net Value of Stock Options Exercised to the former list of components. The average annual
CEO compensation in our sample is $4.23 million (TDC1; includes the value of granted
stock options) and $4.27 million when the net value of exercised option is accounted for
(TDC2). The median compensation values are $2.33 million and $1.81 million, respectively.
The average CEO in our sample has a CEO tenure of 106 months (8.83 years) and gets
his/her first CEO job in a publicly listed company at the age of 52.5 years.9 The individuals
in our sample graduate on average at the age of 23.3 years, they start their career (as far as
8More detail on these variables can be found in Table 3.A2 in Appendix 3.2.
9This relatively young age for first-time CEOs in public firms is consistent with the findings of Schoar and
Zuo (2012) that CEOs born in later decades start their CEO jobs at younger and younger ages. Most CEOs
in our dataset were born in the 1950s and 1960s.
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it can be traced back in our data, not necessarily the first firm if it is a private firm) at the
average age of 29.6 years.10 The average career start in a public company (observations for
which we have firm data) happens at the age of 36.4 years.
56.27% of individuals become CEOs in the same public company where they start their
career. 5.74% of individuals start in a top-ten company. More than 65% of these CEOs are
also the chairman of the board of directors in addition to their CEO assignment. Around
40% of the CEOs are hired from outside the firm. Around a third of our CEO-to-be’s have
an MBA degree. Only about 1.5% of the individuals in our sample are women. From among
the CEO-level controls, CEO tenure and the CEO & Chairman indicator have the highest
correlation (0.323), suggesting that more experienced CEOs tend to be more powerful.11 The
other pairwise correlations within this group of variables are close to zero. The CEO-level
and firm-level controls are also weakly correlated.
We employ six instrumental variables: (1) The recession indicator equals one if NBER
identified the period at which the CEO entered the company as contraction or through.
15.78% of individuals in our sample start their career in a recession or through (11.78%
when considering only public firms for which we have data). 14.07% of individuals graduate
at the time of a contraction or through. In some instances, for purposes of comparison,
we employ Schoar and Zuo’s (2012) recession-year indicator which identifies years of mild
economic expansion or recession, i.e. years that do not contain the peak of a business cycle.
The correlation between the two NBER business cycle classification based indicators is low
(0.0454). The limitation of these indicators is that they are based on NBER’s ex-post business
cycle classification and may not reflect market participant’s expectations concerning the
business cycle at the given historical moment; (2) The average U.S. unemployment rate
for the preceding year is another macroeconomic instrument. The unemployment rate is
a coincident, countercyclical indicator; (3) The investment-grade bond yield spread is the
10We can address the concern of data non-availability for private firms by using macro conditions in the
graduation year or at the date of the first position (”reduced-form” regressions).
11On the importance of controlling for CEO power, see, for example, Adams et al. (2005).
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difference between interest rates on highest quality bonds (Standard & Poor’s Aaa) and
lowest quality bonds (Standard & Poor’s Baa) in the category of investment-grade bonds. In
times of economic strain, this spread is wider. Conditional on financial markets’ ability to
reflect market participants’ expectations of the future (i.e. conditional on financial markets
being efficient to some extent), financial indicators such as the evolution of the S&P 500
composite index or bond yield spreads are useful indicators, readily available at any phase of
the business cycle; (4) The one-year change in the S&P 500 index volume, (5) the one-year
return on the S&P 500, and (6) the standard deviation of returns on this index of the 500
biggest publicly traded companies are three financial-markets-related instruments as in Oyer
(2008), with which we complement the NBER-classification-based and macro indicators.
The instruments are weakly or only moderately correlated with firm-level and CEO-
level controls and exhibit somewhat stronger correlations among themselves. The strongest
positive within-sample correlation arises between the investment-grade bond yield spread and
the unemployment rate (0.562) and the strongest negative correlation between the recession
indicator and the S&P 500 return (-0.587) (see Table 3.A3 in Appendix 3.3).
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the evolution of firm size throughout CEOs’ careers. We depict
the average market capitalization (y-axis) at the time of the job market entry (x-axis) and,
on each other separate plot, the average firm sizes 10, 20 and 30 years after the job market
entry. In Figure 3.1, we plot the in-sample average market capitalizations for all firms for
which we have data in a given year 10 years, 20 years or 30 years after the initial year. To
capture the macroeconomic conditions at the time of the market entry, we also include a
dotted line: it shows the annual S&P 500 index return during the career-start years. Up
to the mid-1970s and from the mid-1980s on, we can observe procyclicality demonstrating
itself as the very similar shapes of the plots of the S&P 500 return and the average market
capitalization at the start of career. In Figure 3.2, we plot the average market capitalizations
only for firms where the initial CEOs work for 10 years, 20 years or 30 years. We focus on
the same cohort of future CEOs through time. The attrition is, naturally, more pronounced
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in this graph (as shown by the changes in the numbers of observations below the line chart).
If our hypothesis on the persistence of conditions at the first job holds true, we would
expect very similar shapes for all full lines in the two figures. For example, individuals
who started their career at smaller (worse quality/less successful) firms, would also work on
average for smaller firms 10, 20 or 30 years later. However, such pattern does not emerge
in any of the figures. The lines for average firm sizes take on very diverging shapes; more
often than not they exhibit very weak similarity in shape. More frequently in Figure 3.2
than in Figure 3.1, they intersect on several instances which means that CEOs who started
out at a larger firm may later end up either in a smaller firm, or in a larger firm - there is
no pattern identifiable or easily perceptible from the plots. Furthermore, the full lines for
average firm size at the start of career correspond to the shape of the dotted lines representing
the macro conditions at the start of career only to a very small extent. Although the number
of observations for each depicted entry year is fairly equally distributed, we need to keep in
mind the selection bias in our data. All the individuals we consider become CEOs at some
point. Some of them become CEOs faster than others (on average, they take around 20
years), so the period for which we can follow each of them in their CEO position in our data
is also quite different (on average, 7.5 years).
3.3 Empirical methodology
We base our empirical methodology on Graham et al.’s (2012) executive compensation speci-
fication. It is a version of the classic Mincerian earnings function augmented to include fixed
effects to address omitted-variable bias. Fixed effects estimation however cannot address
all instances when explanatory variables and idiosyncratic errors are correlated. Omitted-
variable bias may arise due to unobserved time-varying factors, measurement errors, or si-
multaneous responses to exogenous shocks.12 Instrumental variable regressions may address
several issues in our panel affected by selection and endogeneity. The small percentage of
12Under fixed effect estimation here we also include least squares dummy variable estimation.
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within-sample movers as well as the smaller statistical power in firm fixed effects when we
have a large number of firms relatively to the sample size give us further incentives to engage
in instrumental variables estimation.
Our approach in the instrumental variables estimation is similar to that of Oyer (2006;
2008): our start-of-career measure is a proxy for first placement success (First Firm Size).
We instrument our main explanatory variable with measures for macroeconomic conditions
at the start of the individual’s career. The regressor of interest in our case is just a “more
lagged” version of a firm-level control (the lag varies between 2 and 55 years). Individuals
may choose when and in which firm they start their careers but instrumenting should capture
the variation in first jobs beyond the individuals’ control.13
As a point of departure in examining the persistent effect of first job circumstances, we
define the following pooled OLS regression:
Log(Comp)jt = α + βLog(FirstF irmSize)i,t−k +Xj,t(−1)γ + Y i(t)δ + εjt (3.1)
where j, i, t and k indicate companies, individuals, current years and the time that passed
since the job market entry, respectively. Log(Comp)jt is firm j ’s CEO’s log-transformed com-
pensation (TDC1 or TDC2) at time t. Log(FirstF irmSize)i,t−k is the log-transformed size
of the firm where the current CEO i started his/her career.14 Xj,t(−1) represents the vector of
firm-level controls. They correspond to the controls used in managerial compensation regres-
13Schoar and Zuo (2012) have a slightly different approach. With their “recession CEO” indicator variable,
they directly control for whether the individual started his/her career during a recession year. They account
for possible self-selection and timing one’s job market market entry by instrumenting the “recession CEO”
dummy with the individual’s year of birth plus 24, the average age at which the individuals in their sample
enter the job market. This timing is probably more relevant for individuals with average abilities. As
discussed for example in (Oyer, 2006), “superstar” employees are likely to be hired without regard to the
phase of the business cycle.
14As for the coefficient estimates of interest, we report regression results with First Market Capitaliza-
tion(main tables of results) and First Total Assets (due to similarity with the market capitalization results,
reported mostly in the appendix). Note that for greater consistency, the current (lagged) firm size control
variable corresponds to the first firm size variable; with First Market Capitalization, we use log-transformed
lagged current market capitalization, and with First Total Assets, we use log-transformed lagged current
total assets.
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sions in Graham et al. (2012). We control for firm size (lagged one period, log-transformed),
market-to-book ratio (lagged one period), return on assets (both current and lagged one pe-
riod), stock return (both current and lagged one period) and stock return volatility (during
five years up to and including the current year). Y i(t) represents the vector of CEO-level
controls. We include indicators for holding an MBA degree, for being a powerful CEO in
terms of chairing the board of directors, and for being a female CEO. In addition, we control
for CEO tenure (a log-transformed variable).
The simple pooled OLS regressions are expanded to include year dummies (τt, to control
for time fixed effects), year dummies and industry dummies, and eventually, as in Eq. (3.2)
below, year and firm fixed effects (ιj):
15
Log(Comp)jt = βLog(FirstF irmSize)i,t−k +Xj,t(−1)γ + Y i(t)δi(t) + τt + ιj + εjt (3.2)
In the interpretation of results from the latter, we need to keep in mind that due to a small
percentage of within-sample movers (less than 1%), applying firm fixed effects is almost
equivalent to including CEO fixed effects. Graham et al. (2012) highlight the importance
of including both firm and managerial fixed effect in compensation regressions to avoid mis-
leading coefficient estimates.16 But they also point out that controlling for unobserved het-
erogeneity should correspond to the goals of the research. When dealing with variables that
vary cross-sectionally or are highly time-persistent, fixed effects may wipe out the variation
of interest. Since our main variable of interest, the firm size at the start of a career, is time-
invariant and fixed for each individual, CEO fixed effects would pick up this influence and
distort the estimation of first firm size effects.
We run the pooled OLS and other specifications for the full sample as well as for two
15We identify industries according to the Fama-French 12 industry classification.
16According to Graham et al.’s (2012) results, manager fixed effects and firm fixed effects contribute
significantly to their model’s R-squared. The fraction of the model sum of squares corresponding to manager
fixed effects and firm fixed effects is 54% and 25%, respectively.
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subsamples. Subsample 1 is obtained from the full sample by applying the condition that the
time difference between starting the first job in a public firm and becoming a CEO is at least
10 years. The idea is to decrease the influence of possible firm size/performance persistence
on current CEO compensation. Subsample 2 is obtained from Subsample 1 by applying the
additional condition that the individual is not more than 30 years of age at the start of
his/her career (in a public firm). Thus we intend to examine the effects for observations for
which we are probably capturing the very beginning of an individual’s career. A drawback
of applying the two conditions is a significant decrease in the number of observations. We
lose more than half of observations by moving from the full sample to Subsample 2.
Controlling for time-invariant firm heterogeneities in panel data may take us beyond cor-
relation analysis and can be considered suggestive of a causal relationship going from - in
our case - first firm size to current CEO compensation. Instrumental variables estimation
(in this case, two-step least squares, 2SLS) can be used as another technique to study causal
relationships. The success of the technique lies in the choice of instruments. These instru-
ments should be strong, valid and take proper account of possible heterogeneous responses
of economic agents (Murray, 2006).17 Instruments always represent a somewhat arbitrary
choice but require a lot of sophistication in order to establish credibility in the results. The
consistency of instrumental variables estimation may be defeated by huge inefficiency issues,
even to the point that instrumental variables estimation does not offer any advantage over
largely biased inconsistent OLS estimates.
We use two sets of instruments, each of which includes three variables. The financial-
markets-related set of excluded instruments comprises the one-year S&P 500 volume change,
one-year S&P 500 return and two-year S&P 500 standard deviation. The set of macroeconomic-
conditions-related instruments includes the recession indicator, the investment-grade bond
17We are studying a group of individuals all of whom eventually become CEOs. To the point that this
group may be considered less heterogeneous than, for example, a large cohort of workers with different job
attainments, we can expect less heterogeneous reactions to the changes in the business cycle. This certainly
does not imply that by studying the given group of individuals and their employers we ensure capturing the
economically interesting responses.
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yield spread and the one-year average US unemployment rate. We also run instrumental
variables regressions with a single instrument by including each variable from the previous
two instrumental variable sets separately. This helps understand the particular influence and
contribution of each of the instrumental variables to the results. “Reduced-form” regressions
serve as another robustness check for the relationship between variables that are separated in
the two stages of 2SLS. In these regressions, instruments enter in the main equation, replac-
ing the instrumented main variable of interest. “Reduced-form” equations serve as important
checks for the instruments’ intuition, and if the instruments are valid, these equations are
estimated consistently with OLS (Murray, 2006).
All individuals in our sample become CEOs at some point in their career. After the
panel data analysis, we turn to cross-sectional regressions by examining the effects of first
job conditions on first CEO compensation:
Log(FirstComp)i = α + βLog(FirstF irmSize)i +Xjγ + Y iδ + εi (3.3)
where Log(FirstComp)i represents the individual i ’s first compensation (TDC1 or TDC2)
as CEO. As before, Log(FirstF irmSize)i may stand for First Market Capitalization or
First Total Assets. We then replace Log(FirstF irmSize)i in Eq. (3.3) with the TopTeni
indicator, or directly with several variables from among the instruments that characterize
the macroeconomic conditions at the time of the individual’s first job or at the time of
his/her graduation. Note that the cross-sections for when we employ macro variables as main
explanatory variables are larger compared to the previous cross-sectional samples since we are
not required to have information on the individuals’ first employers. Data on macroeconomic
conditions at the time of the job market entry are more widely available than company data.
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3.4 Results
In Subsection 3.4.1, we discuss the results from employing the empirical methodology sug-
gested in Section 3.3. Some of these tests already serve as robustness checks to the benchmark
results. In Subsection 3.4.2, we offer and discuss further considerations to test the robustness
of the main results.
3.4.1 Main results
Table 3.2 presents our benchmark results. We run pooled OLS, least squares dummy variable
(LSDV) regressions and fixed effects regressions with the full sample and Subsamples 1 and 2.
The results from the simplest of the specifications, pooled OLS, suggest a statistically strongly
significant association between first firm size and CEO compensation. The effect amounts to
3.57%, 4.11% and 4.39% for a one-standard-deviation change in First Market Capitalization
for the full sample, Subsample 1 and Subsample 2, respectively. (A one-standard-deviation
change in First Market Capitalization is 2.58-times the full-sample mean.) Similarly, when
total assets are used as the firm size control as in Table 3.A4 in Appendix 3.4, the estimates
on First Total Assets suggest a strongly statistically significant effect of approximately 3%
for the full sample and Subsample 1, and 4.83% for Subsample 2. After we control for more
factors by including year dummies and year and industry dummies, the estimated effects
corresponding to a one-standard-deviation change in first firm size slightly decrease but are
still between 2 and 3%. The statistical significance of these results is lower; for TDC2,
however, we do not obtain significant results.
Firm fixed effects may partially control for causality. In all but one of the fixed effects
regressions, the effect of first firm size on CEO compensation is not found to be statistically
significant. The coefficient estimates on first firm size become rather small (under 1%),
in some cases negative. In Panel C of Table 3.2, the estimated effect of a one-standard-
deviation change in first firm size on TDC2 is large, 10.53%, but statistically significant
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only at the 10% level. In Table 3.A4, with total assets as the control for firm size, we find
overall less statistically significant results. The absence of statistically significant results
in the regressions with firm fixed effects may have two different interpretations: there are
indeed no persistent effects in first job conditions on CEO pay, suggesting the executive job
market is efficient and does not reward CEOs for good initial conditions. The other possible
explanation is the lack of variation in the observations (little within-firm variation, large
number of firms for too few observations), and thus lack of support in the data to perform a
firm fixed effect regression.
Instrumental variables (IV) regressions are another possibility to explore causal effects go-
ing from first job conditions to CEO compensation. Panel A of Table 3.3 reports the results
from instrumenting First Market Capitalization with the set of financial-markets-related in-
struments. There are no positive and statistically significant results. The estimates suggest
a large, in most cases negative effect on CEO pay for both TDC1 and TDC2. Individuals
starting their career in smaller firms (in worse economic times) earn on average approxi-
mately between 30% to 50% more for a one-standard-deviation change in firm size. The
signs of the coefficients for the instruments based on the S&P 500 are as expected, although
the positive signs of the strongly statistically significant estimates for the S&P 500 volatility
are not straightforward to interpret. Accumulated empirical evidence suggests that causality
between financial market volatility and recessions works in both directions (e.g., Hamilton
and Lin, 1996; Engle et al., 2008). Higher uncertainty in the financial markets may be re-
flected in higher volatility of the financial markets and may trigger a recession. Our volatility
measure covers the two years before the individual’s job market entry. The results suggest a
strong positive association between First Market Capitalization and stock market volatility
on average. The possible effect of a recession in that it decreases the average market capi-
talization may show up later, when stock market volatility is lower, but it could be induced
also by this larger volatility.
When employing the set of proxies for macroeconomic conditions as instruments in Panel
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B of Table 3.3, there are less statistically significant results. The estimated effects are, again,
negative, suggesting that starting out at a company larger by one standard deviation leads to
lower CEO compensation (TDC1) by as much as 30%. Although the estimates of the macro
instruments in the first stage are not statistically significant at conventional levels, they are
of the expected sign. The overidentification tests in both Panel A and B of Table 3.3 all fail
to reject the null and suggest that our instruments are not weak. The endogeneity tests fail
to reject the null in a number of cases, thus suggesting that we might be better off using
non-IV regressions.
When running the IV tests with each instrument separately (Table 3.4), all coefficient esti-
mates on First Market Capitalization are negative and suggest large negative effects on CEO
compensation for a one-standard-deviation increase in first firm size, most of them between
20 and 80%. The results are, however, not statistically significant. Marginally statistically
significant results (at the 10% level) arise when we instrument First Market Capitalization
with S&P 500 standard deviation. For a one-standard-deviation increase in First Market
Capitalization, CEO compensation decreases by 39% and 47% for TDC1 and TDC2, respec-
tively. The signs of the instruments’ coefficients in the first stage are as expected; half of these
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level.18 The results from Table 3.4 provide
some support for the hypothesis that, as a consequence of being rewarded for succeeding in
a stricter selection process in bad economic times, starting a career in a recession results in
higher CEO pay on average.
We rerun regressions from Eq. (3.1) and its variations with First Firm Rank and lagged
current firm rank in place of the firm size measures. By using firm rank, we study first job
effects after flattening the variation in firm size. To establish the firm rank, we order the firms
from largest to smallest in each year and assign them their ordinal numbers. The largest
18The regressions in Table 3.4 also include regressions with Schoar and Zuo’s (2012) recession year indicator
as one of the instruments (see Table 3.A2 in Appendix 3.2 for variable definitions). The sign of its coefficient
estimate is positive, opposite to that of our recession indicator. This might be the consequence of the
recession year indicator capturing on average mild but still positive economic activity while the recession
indicator captures only adverse conditions.
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firm receives the highest number which equals the total number of firms in the group. The
rank is a number between 0 and 1, computed as n:N where n stands for the ordinal number
of the firm and N is the total number of firms. The biggest firm is ranked 1 and the smallest
very close to 0 if the number of firms in the group is large. Thus, in Table 3.5, we replace
First Market Capitalization with First Firm Rank based on ranking firms in each starting
year according to their initial market capitalization. The results with these “smoothed out”
data support the conclusions from Table 3.2. Good conditions at the start of a career may
lead to higher CEO compensation but the question remains whether we control for sufficient
factors in these regressions. The coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level for
all specifications with TDC1 as the response variable, except for when we control for firm
fixed effects. The size of the effects corresponding to a one-standard-deviation increase in
the measure of firm size is larger than in Table 3.2, between 6 and 12% for specifications in
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 3.5. As for TDC2, we obtain strong results only in the simplest,
the pooled OLS specification (Column 5). Overall, the effects are slightly stronger for the
regressions where we set the upper limit for the age at the start of one’s career to 30 years
(unreported results with Subsample 2).
Another variable to characterize the conditions of first employment in a public company
is Top Ten. Following Schoar and Zuo (2012), Top Ten is an indicator variable that equals
one if the individual started his/her career in one of the following top-ten firms: Arthur
Andersen, AT&T, DuPont, Ford, General Electric, General Motors, IBM, McKinsey, Procter
& Gamble, and Texas Instruments (Schoar and Zuo, 2012, p. 9). When we characterize start-
of-career success as working for a top-ten firm, the findings do not differ much from those in
Tables 3.2, 3.A4 and 3.5. In Table 3.6, we report results from LSDV regressions with year
and industry dummies, using the full sample and both subsamples. Market capitalization
is the measure for firm size. The estimates suggest a long-term positive effect between 12-
14.5% of starting a career in a top-ten firm on CEOs’ TDC1 compensation. The effects are
statistically significant (at the 5% level) for TDC1 in the role of the response variable for the
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full sample only. The average effect on TDC2 amounts to 5.7-9% but these results are not
statistically significant at conventional levels.19
To further study the persistence of effects of the start-of-career conditions on CEO com-
pensation, we run “reduced-form” regressions in which macroeconomic variables that serve
as instruments in the instrumental variables regressions now appear as the main explana-
tory variable. This allows us to look at the time closest to our individuals’ career start -
at the first employment and at graduation.20 We do not need first firm data here; we use
data on macroeconomic conditions that are more widely available. We focus on variables
whose influence on CEO pay we hypothesize is indirect, through first firm size. In Table 3.7,
we report results with the specification including year and industry dummies, with the full
sample, and with market capitalization as the control for current firm size.21 The estimates
are not statistically significant at conventional levels and their signs largely vary, suggesting
no long-term impact of the start-of-career conditions - whether macroeconomic conditions
at the start of the first job or at graduation - on CEO pay. Schoar and Zuo’s (2012) reces-
sion year indicator at graduation is the only exception here. The coefficient estimate on the
recession year indicator suggests a rather large negative effect, 9%, on CEO compensation
(TDC1) which is strongly statistically significant (at the 1% level). Finding a negative effect
supports the hypothesis of procyclical cohort effects in compensation and imprinting effects
at the start of future CEOs’ career. It might be the case that the recession year indicator is
a better characterization of initial conditions, capturing influences that the other variables
do not, but persistence in firm size may also be driving the results (the results are from
regressions on the full sample).
Even if the results concerning persistent effects of first job conditions on CEO pay remain
19Table 3.A5 in Appendix 3.5 reports the results with total assets as the control for firm size. The results
are similar. The coefficients on Top Ten are all positive, of comparable magnitude, and significant at the 5%
level for TDC1 in both the full sample and Subsample 1.
20The first employer may be a private firm for which data is not available at all, or at least it is not easily
obtainable.
21Table 3.A6 in Appendix 3.6 reports the results with total assets as the control for current firm size. The
results are similar.
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weak or ambivalent, circumstances at the start of future CEOs’ career may influence their
first CEO compensation. In Table 3.8, we present these results. In Panel A of Table 3.8,
the estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level for all regressions on TDC1. We
run regressions with Subsamples CS and CS1.22 Working for a larger firm, both in terms
of market capitalization and total assets, or for a top-ten firm at the beginning of the in-
dividuals’ career contributes to a larger CEO compensation. Since all individuals in our
sample become CEOs, we capture the effect of the promotion from a non-CEO to a CEO po-
sition.23 A one-standard-deviation increase in firm size is associated with 3-5% higher CEO
compensation (we obtain a larger effect on TDC1 than on TDC2). The effect of starting out
at a top-ten firm is approximately 26% for TDC1, about 10 times larger than for the one-
standard-deviation increase in first firm size. The estimates on the top-ten indicator are not
statistically significant at convetional levels for TDC2 as the CEO pay measure. In Panel B of
Table 3.8, we report results from “reduced-form” cross-sectional regressions: as in Table 3.7,
the macroeconomic conditions at the time of the first job and at graduation are employed as
main explanatory variables. A number of estimates is now strongly statistically significant.
For TDC1, the effects of conditions at graduation are moderately higher than at the start
of the first job. A one-standard-deviation increase in unemployment rate (1.5%) represents
a 3.7% increase in first CEO pay (TDC1) if at the start of the first job and 5% if at gradu-
ation. The respective effects for a one-standard-deviation increase in the bond-yield spread
(0.5%) are 5% and 6% for TDC1, and 4.7% and 6% for TDC2. The direction of estimated
effects supports the hypothesis of granting larger compensations for CEOs hired in turbulent
economic times. Thus, to be hired in a recession may mean passing a stricter, more careful
selection process, a sign of better skills and qualities which are rewarded correspondingly.
In Table 3.9, we replicate selected regressions from Table IV and Panel B of Table V
in Schoar and Zuo (2012) using our data so as to perform further testing of the first job
22Subsample CS is a cross section obtained by selecting the observations with the very first CEO pay for
each CEO. For more details on the subsamples, see Table 3.A1 in Appendix 3.1.
23Graham et al. (2012) discuss the promotion versus the person-specific effects in the context of their
empirical model with manager fixed effects.
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effects on the first CEO compensation. These regressions examine the effects of the first job
conditions on the first CEO compensation under a different (simpler) specification:
Log(FirstComp)i = α + βRecessionY eari + τd + ιs + εi (3.4)
where Log(FirstComp)i is the first CEO compensation (TDC1 or TDC2, log-transformed)
of individual i and RecessionY eari is the recession year indicator for the year when indi-
vidual i started his/her career. Schoar and Zuo (2012) control for decade and industry fixed
effects where d denotes the decade in which the CEO was born and s is the industry in which
the individual started his/her career.24 The alternative specifications replace Recession Year
with the Top Ten indicator and/or add firm-level controls (Total Assets, Return on Assets
and Sales). Except for the specification in Column (6) of our Table 3.9, the signs of the
estimates on the recession year indicator as the main explanatory variable are negative. This
suggests that individuals who start their careers in a “recession year” receive lower first CEO
compensation, but the estimates are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Ac-
cording to the Schoar and Zuo regression specifications where the top-ten indicator is the
main explanatory variable, all but the estimate in Column (8) are statistically significant at
the 1% level. The positive effects on the first CEO compensation suggested by the estimates
are very large: 84% on TDC1 (Column 3), but it decreases to 35% on TDC1 when current
firm controls are included (Column 4), and to 38% on TDC2 in the specification without
current firm controls (Column 7). The results in Schoar and Zuo (2012) are obtained with a
smaller number of observations and are stronger for the recession year indicator than for the
top-ten indicator. Our results further support the findings from Panel A of our Table 3.8
that the first CEO pay (at least for the compensation measured by TDC1) may be as much
as 30% higher if the individual started his/her career in a top-ten public company.
24The industries are identified according to the first SIC digit.
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3.4.2 Robustness analysis
If all individuals in our sample were movers, that is, if all CEOs could be observed in at least
one other firm, employing firm fixed effects would be a useful strategy to quantify the first
firm size effects. As discussed above, this is not the case, thus the coefficient estimates of first
firm size may be conflated (firm fixed effects wipe out the time-constant between-manager
variation). These estimates may also be otherwise altered due to possible omitted variable
bias.
Despite the data issues, we can still get an idea of a distortion in coefficient estimates if we
perform cross-section regressions for selected years.25 Table 3.10 reports the results from such
cross-section regressions, with market capitalization as the measure for firm size. Table 3.A7
in Appendix 3.7 reports the results with total assets as the control for firm size. The selected
years are 1995, 2000 and 2005. 2005 is the year with the largest number of observations, 1995
and 2000 were selected to representatively cover and be evenly spread out throughout the
data period 1992-2007. When we compare the magnitudes, signs and statistical significance
of coefficients in Table 3.2 to the ones in Table 3.10 (or, alternatively, those in Table 3.A4 to
the ones in Table 3.A7), the coefficients of the control variables remain rather stable. The
coefficients of interest are low in magnitude, not very different from to the ones obtained in
the benchmark regressions with firm fixed effects. The estimated coefficients on first firm
size are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Only First Market Capitalization
is positively associated with the 2000 TDC1 compensation at the 5% level (Column 2 in
Panel B of Table 3.10); similarly for First Total Assets and TDC2 in Column 6 in Panel A
of Table 3.A7.26
In some instances, tests for validity and strength of instruments point to our instruments
being weak. OLS estimation should be preferred to instrumental variables estimation in
25Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) use one-year regression as a robustness check to a model driven by
between-firm variation, a model where using firm-fixed effects may be fallacious.
26On an interesting note, the results in both Table 3.10 and Table 3.A7 suggest that in the mid-nineties,
female CEO may have earned significantly less than male CEOs. 1995 is the year with least observations so
this may affect the results but the 1% significance holds not only for the full sample but for Subsample 2 as
well.
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these cases. We make another attempt for instrumental variables estimation with a set of
employment rate related variables. In the context of studying cohort effect in promotions,
Kwon et al. (2010) find that employment rate in interaction with the employment growth
rate matter more than the unemployment rate alone. The key to this argument is that
the employment growth rate is a variable reflecting economic prospects, a forward-looking
variable. Using the set of employment-related variables (the US annual employment rate, the
US annual employment growth rate, and the interaction term of the former two variables),
however, does not lift the suspicion of weak instruments. As reported in Table 3.11, all
tests, from partial correlations and first-stage R-squared through weak identification tests
and endogeneity tests, indicate that we are probably better off without engaging in 2SLS
estimation. The coefficients on First Firm Size are not statistically significant at conventional
levels, they may carry very large bias and thus be misleading. The conclusions are the same
for the alternative firm size measure, and for both Subsample 1 and Subsample 2 (unreported
results). Our choice of alternative instruments proves to be of little aid in determining first job
effects but - rather than performing first-stage data mining - it can be credited with a careful
evaluation of theoretical arguments, some of which are supported by empirical research.
Advances in instrumental variables estimation due to the work of Moreira (2003) and
Mikusheva (2010) allow for weak-instrument robust testing with conditional likelihood ratio
(CLR) confidence sets. We report these results in Table 3.12. The first row of each panel
contains the coefficient estimates of First Market Capitalization obtained through normal
approximation. We include this coefficient’s limited information maximum likelihood (LIML)
estimates for comparison as well as some first-stage diagnostics. Columns (3) and (6) of each
panel contain perhaps the most important results - the results from LSDV estimation with
year and industry dummies.27 With the financial-markets-related and the employment-rate-
related sets of instruments, we find CLR confidence sets with a rather large span (the p-values
27The data does not support fixed-effect 2SLS estimation. Also, the results for TDC1 are likely to be less
erratic (although one may argue that the Black and Scholes model is not the most appropriate to determine
the value of the stock options granted). TDC2 includes the value of exercised stock options, thus it is more
likely to be affected by measurement error.
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are large but so are the sets). When the set of macro variables is used as instruments, the
CLR confidence sets become narrower. The results are strongly statistically significant and
suggest a negative effect of first firm size on CEO compensation. The suggested first firm size
elasticity relative to CEO compensation varies between -0.1 and -0.8% (taking into account all
CLR-confidence-set results in Column (3) in all panels of Table 3.12). The negative sign lends
support to the countercyclical cohort effects theory: individuals who due to the bad economy
started their careers in smaller firms on average, earn higher CEO compensation. Thus,
again, to succeed and be hired in a bad economy could be a sign of higher ability. During
recessions, firms may apply stricter selection processes in order to find the best match, the
most able employees. When performing the weak instrument robust testing with Subsample
2 (untabulated results), the results suggest positive effects which, in most cases, are not
statistically significant at conventional levels. Cohort effects seem to be inexistent in CEO
compensation when we pick observations with the earliest possible stages of the individuals’
careers but we have to keep in mind the much lower number of observations used to obtain
these results.
3.5 Conclusion
Several recent papers study the possible influence of initial career conditions on individuals’
current professional situation. They find that a good economy makes it more likely to start
one’s career in a position with better opportunities and plays a role in shaping one’s career
path in the long term. So much so that those whose initial placement is a worse match may
not be able to catch up to their luckier peers. We study CEOs in publicly listed companies and
investigate whether the conditions at the time these individuals start their careers influence
their current CEO compensation. Do CEOs whose job market entry coincides with a bad
economy earn less than their counterparts who started their first job assignment in peaks
and booms?
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We test the influence of the quality of initial placement through pooled ordinary least
squares, least square dummy variables and fixed effects regressions, as well as instrumental
variables regressions. We do not find evidence that first firm size has a persistent procyclical
effect on CEO compensation. Thus, the niche of the job market seems to play a role in how
persistent first job effects are. Even if first positions influence subsequent job attainment
and compensation, more than two decades into the individuals’ careers this effect seems
to disappear when it comes to (future) CEOs. The results from instrumental variables
estimation lend support to the notion of countercyclical cohort effects in CEO compensation.
Our results from cross-section regressions suggest that initial career conditions (firm size,
top-ten firm) have a large effect on the first CEO compensation. A large part of the pay
increase - as much as 30% - comes from individual-specific factors positively correlated with
initial job conditions. The increase in first CEO compensation due to initial job conditions
dissipates over time, suggesting efficient workings of the executive job market. A number of
robustness checks support these conclusions.
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